TOWSON UNIVERSITY

Journal of Historical Studies

2018



Volume 15



2018

Volume 15

Department of History
College of Liberal Arts
8000 York Road, Towson MD 21252

Towson Journal of Historical Studies is a faculty refereed journal for the publication of original undergraduate work in history.

Towson Journal of Historical Studies, 2018 Edition

Cover Image courtesy of Towson University Archives, 2018

Cover design and typesetting by
Sophia Zahner and the Editorial Board
Printed by Towson University Press

Contents

Note From The Department Chair

It is a pleasure and privilege to recognize the commitment and work of the many students and faculty who have contributed to the publication of the 2018 edition of the Towson University *Journal of Historical Studies*.

Since the first edition of the *Journal* appeared in the Spring of 1998 under the initiative and leadership of student-editor Ms. Shannon Stevens, the *Journal* has continued as a highly successful student-centered enterprise. The energy, direction, and, most importantly, the essays themselves, all come from Towson students, especially those who are members of the History Honor Society, *Phi Alpha Theta, Theta-Beta* chapter.

Faculty have played a key role in assisting, advising, and mentoring Towson students with the *Journal*. Dr. Karl Larew provided critical support for the launch of the *Journal*, and the continuing hard work and dedication of the *Theta-Beta* chapter Faculty Advisor, Dr. Benjamin Zajicek, and of *Journal* Faculty Advisor Dr. Tunde Oduntan, have helped maintain a strong record of accomplishment for the *Journal*.

Working together, students and faculty have realized an important achievement, one that reflects well upon the Department of History and Towson University, but that most of all makes evident the intelligence, writing skill, and determination of Towson students. Congratulations on the great success of your efforts!

Ronn Pineo
Professor and Chair
Department of History
Towson University

Note From The Editors

For historians, the excitement is in the process. To find, to search, to decipher: these are the greatest joys of the historical detective, ever trying to discover the secrets of yesterday. As editors of the 2018 *Towson Journal of Historical Studies*, we are lucky to showcase the fruits of Towson University's historians' labor. These investigators of the past have worked hard to chronicle the stories of communities across the globe, from Japan to Russia to our own Towson University. The histories presented in this volume are the best of Towson's history writers, and we, as an Editorial Board, are grateful for the opportunity to review and present such interesting and exciting work.

In "Sounds of Resistance," author Morgan House historically contextualizes the modern generation of Japanese youth known as the "freeter." A freeter is a disillusioned Japanese youth, who is stuck within the stagnated bubble economy of Japan, a result of Japan's post- World War II economic policies. Due to the stagnated economy, the youth is unable to find a permanent, well-paying jobs. This has an extremely negative impact on the Japanese youth economically, socially, and psychologically, as they are unable to successfully transition to adulthood. Next, the author draws comparisons between two seemingly unrelated topics, the freeter generation and the rise of noise music, a new musical genre in Japan. Noise music is described as the foil of music as it is comprised of non-traditional sounds that might make some people uncomfortable.. The author strongly argues that the rise in noise music in Japan is a social manifestation of the freeter generation and its frustrations.

Much in contrast with the social history of the Japanese freeter, the next article, "'Human Dust': General Wrangel and the Russian Exiles," recounts the political narrative of the White Army after the Bolsheviks won the Russian civil war. Carefully written by Ian Lazarenko, this article uniquely recounts a story of defeat rather than victory. However, much can be learned by history's failures. Lazarenko specifically focuses on General Wrangel, the military leader for the Russian White army that fought against the Bolshevik Red Army. Wrangel struggled after the defeat of the White Army to lead the loyalists who supported the Czar and had been exiled to Europe. Lazarenko chronicles the General's endless, yet failed, attempts to get the recognition of the foreign governments. Lazarenko reminds readers that a war has two sides, and while histories tend to focus on the victors, the losing side has a story of its own.

Returning to the genre of social history, in "Fraternizing in the Face of Femininity," author Sarah Patrini deciphers the increased popularity of fraternities in mid-19th century United States. She adeptly argues that men started joining fraternities in response to the feminization of society. To avoid this feminized society, white men joined fraternities and excluded women and other races from such groups. In fraternal orders, men were allowed to reclaim and reassert their manhood through various rituals. In addition, these orders provided men with upward social mobility and monetary support, allowing them to assert their dominance in society as members of a higher socioeconomic class and in the household as the breadwinners. Thus, these fraternal orders asserted and confirmed the masculinity of white men.

Next, in "Jadids, Muslim Marxism, and the Soviet State," Michael Scirè eloquently details the evolution of the dynamic relationship between the Jadids and Soviet state, placing the cultural movement within a political context. This relationship was initially marked by mutual support: the Jadids mixed principles of Marxism with Islam, and the Bolsheviks supported the Jadids' cultural revolution. However, Scirè rightfully notes that conflict was inevitable. The Jadids mixed socialism with nationalism, which conflicted with Soviet ideology. Furthermore, the Jadids soon realized that the Soviet government was less committed to the "East" than to its European subjects, and they began criticizing Soviet policies. The ideological differences between the two groups led to a deterioration of their relationship, and fitting the nature of the Soviet regime, this deterioration manifested in suspicion and purges of the Jadids.

Finally, author, Morgan Sigur analyzes a subject close to home by reviewing Towson University's interactions with African American students during and after the Civil Rights Movement in her article, "Black Representation on Campus." Just as more African American students enrolled at Towson, some Black students across the country adopted the ideology of Black Power to express their dissatisfaction over the direction of the Civil Rights Movement. While most Towson students did not join this movement, the campus provided them other empowering opportunities through organizations like the Black Student Union. Through such efforts, Towson University was able to attract more Black students, thereby becoming a more inclusive and diverse campus.

The aforementioned articles provide a rich testament to the historical investigation and analysis occurring at Towson University. We are thankful for the opportunity to compile these works into Volume 15, made possible by the Towson History Department. Specifically, we would like to thank Dr. Oluwatoyin Oduntan for his advice, guidance, and excellent reviewing skills. Dr. Ropers provided invaluable support in the final development of the *Journal*, with his patient teaching of the publishing software. Further, we are grateful for all of the faculty support and hours spent reviewing student submissions. Without their help, this production would not be possible. We would like to thank Felicity

Knox of the Towson University Archives for providing the amazing cover image, taken in Cook Library. Also, we are grateful for the *Theta-Beta* chapter of *Phi Alpha Theta*, the backbone of the *Journal*. Finally, we thank the readers for being interested in historical research. Keep searching for the truth of yesterday!

Feature Articles

Morgan House

Sounds of Resistance: Noise Music and the Japanese Precariat Class

Introduction

The social and economic landscape of contemporary Japan is the product of a long history of war, post-war reconstruction, and economic expansion. Since the 1980s, economic stagnation, through a declining manufacturing sector and the use of increasingly exploited and irregular labor, has plagued the Japanese economy. This article examines the condition of the many Japanese young adults trapped as temporary and part-time casual labor.

The Japanese irregular worker does not exist in an economic, historical, or social vacuum, and as such, is informed by a variety of factors. Japan's post-war economic restructuring and cultural values amidst the backdrop of an increasingly global and neoliberal economy have all played a role in the creation of the irregular worker. This intersection of factors characterizes the position of the irregular worker as dangerous and unstable, becoming increasingly referred to as the "precariat" class by scholars and observers. The aim of this article is to further explore the position of the precariat in Japan and provide an alternate framing for the discussion of this figure, one that pays homage to Japan's fascination with the production and consumption of aural culture. In the same way that the irregular worker in the form of the precariat is the foil of the successful Japanese full-time worker, so too does noise embody a role as the antithesis of music. These pairings are certainly oppositional in nature, but the Japanese irregular worker—one of a precarious social and economic existence—not only occupies the same oppositional role in the comparison above, but may also be characterized as noise itself. This is to say that the troublesome and unnatural presence that can deafen an audience, interrupt a signal, and render a functioning system defunct shares some commonalities with the existence of the precariat, who does not easily fit the modus operandi of social life, employment, goal setting, and achievement in Japan. The tension between realizing one's own dreams, becoming a respectable adult (which unavoidably qualifies discussions of masculinity and maturation), maintaining employment, and maintaining a family all factor into the existence of the Japanese precariat, who occupies and inhabits a space overloaded with innumerable intersecting signals.

In the following pages, I examine the Japanese precariat in terms of both the irregular laborer as well as an individual who creates noise, a fundamental link between noise and the problematized irregular worker. I begin with a brief synopsis of the Japanese post-war economy, before turning to an extended discussion of labor in contemporary Japan. I show how significant

differences in the structures of labor markets (formal vs. informal labor, i.e. full-time vs. part-time) have resulted in an increasingly disillusioned Japanese youth. The rigid economic system, which younger generations have been born into from the late 1970s onward, can be located in the telling presence of noise, noise musicians and activists. Among these, Amamiya Karin,[1] through her music and documentaries, was able to voice anxieties regarding "freeter" positionality as a member of Japan's "Lost Generation."

The Bubble Economy

In the immediate aftermath of the Asia-Pacific War (1931-1945), Japan was a country characterized by the omnipresent influence of the United States. Its burgeoning economy, with the help of the United States, quickly recovered from the destructive war that ravaged the Asian continent and left entire cities leveled. Japan underwent a transformation during the Allied Occupation (1945-1952), as the country's economic mentality went from one of survival (preventing the immediate starvation and death of citizens) to one of rapid growth and economic expansion.[2] Following this trajectory, Japan became an economic and industrial powerhouse and was metaphorically reborn on the world stage as it hosted the Tokyo Olympics in 1964.[3] In the following two decades, a burgeoning "bubble economy," which indulged in rampant real estate and stock speculation, came to a halt, resulting in several significant changes for ordinary workers. While scholars and the media often refer to the bubble "bursting," Brett Walker notes, "an immediate event, but rather a slow deterioration of the economic boom triggered by real estate and stock price inflation."[4] As the reality of the declining economic situation set in, corporations engaged in practices that aimed to generate stability for themselves, while simultaneously stimulating the creation of a stagnant job market and the birth of the "lost generation."[5] Working in tandem with corporations were neoliberal policy reforms enacted by Prime Minister Koizumi Jun'ichiro, whose party laid the foundation for the temporary and casual employment seen in Japan today.

Prime Minister Koizumi's administration was characterized by a motto of "reform," the formula for which was

> "privatization, deregulation, deepening dependence on the United States [...] more patriotism and more national pride, a revised constitution and Fundamental Law of Education, the substitution of a Hayekian, neo-liberal, American way for the Keynesian *doken kokka* ['construction state'] redistributive, egalitarian way."[6]

Perhaps one of Koizumi's most noticeable efforts was the privatization of the Japanese Post Office, a move which was not supported with any solid reasoning. His platform functioned through the avoidance of subjects including "ecological crisis, diplomatic isolation, chronic indebtedness,

population decline and graying, abandonment of the 'Japanese' employment system, rising child crime figures, rising suicide figures, and deep social pessimism."[7] This political aversion to prominent contemporary economic and social issues within the country did nothing more than make issues surrounding the "Lost Generation" less accessible for discussion and resolution.

Defining the Proletariat/Precariat

The path leading to Japan's "bubble economy" provides a better understanding and critique of the growing inequities in the Japanese workforce today. In Marxist theory, the proletariat is a social class characterized by their wage-earning nature and reliance on the sale of their labor as a service. Owning nothing but their labor, they are quick to be exploited by the bourgeoisie who—in a capitalist system—profit off the capital and wealth generated by the proletariat's labor. It could be said from this alone that the position of the proletariat is not favorable, for their position is one of constant uncertainty. One cannot talk about the precariat without understanding the proletariat, for the two terms share linguistic roots. When the term precariat is henceforth used, it will carry with it an implicit understanding of Marx's proletariat.

The precariat has become a term utilized in global discourse to describe not only the precarious position of the proletariat writ large, but also the millions of workers in Japan who are employed on an irregular, non-permanent, and unstable basis.[8] Amamiya Karin, a writer, former member of an ultranationalist punk band, and ally of the precariat movement in Japan, theorizes that the concept of precarity acts as a unification of "various groups of workers through shared vulnerability as the basis for a common cause."[9] Her working definition of the precariat identity includes groups such as "*furītā* or freeters: freelance workers, temporary workers, undocumented workers, and others with low or unstable wages, few or no benefits, and little job security."[10]

This vulnerability cited by Amamiya has an economic component, as these workers struggle to subsist on wage labor that does not offer opportunities of upward mobility. A social component to being in a financially limited situation is present too, because social existence and mobility is almost always tied to one's economic status. As such, freeter issues of social alienation, psychological health, and self-perception cannot be ignored. Historian Romit Dasgupta cites an occurrence in Akihabara in 2008 when a freeter killed seven people and injured many more in an attack that conforms to a post-bubble trend of spontaneous and bizarre violent crimes.[11] Yuma Kobayashi for example, a 24-year old who was attending high school part-time, was arrested in 2016 for a random and fatal stabbing. This seemingly unprovoked incident became more bizarre when Kobayashi, an exemplary face of the freeter demographic, claimed to not remember the incident at all.[12]

Helping explain this violent lashing out, Rosenbaum writes that precariat youth in Japanese culture choose to withdraw from society due to bullying and an inability to find employment and meaning in a world devoid of connection, rather than "[engaging] proactively with the complexities of everyday existence."[13] These complexities are understood as the overwhelming and inaccessible nature of social life and interpersonal relationships, especially for those who are economically disadvantaged. The media speculated that the individual who committed the 2008 Akihabara attack was experiencing feelings of social alienation, something Amamiya articulated so keenly as a scape of rubble visible only to those engaged in an existence marked by precarity. Such experiences construct significant barriers between the lived experiences of freeters and non-freeters (where the gaze of "stable adults" suffers some blind spots), providing a literary terrain in which the plight of the precariat might be internalized by others.[14] In her arguments, public statements, and music, Amamiya consistently draws attention to those engaged in informal labor such as freeters with lived experiences that are completely different from those engaged in formal labor. This failure of understanding falls aligns with the social alienation of the precariat youth who are effectively separated on the grounds of economic and social opportunity.

While many discuss the Akihabara incident, it is imperative to focus on the commonalities with other moments of violence in Japan and to contextualize these acts amongst a larger discussion of Japan's disenfranchised youth in a neo-liberal global economy. As David Harvey coldly states, "The World Bank plainly favors speculative capital over people. The idea that a city can do well (in terms of capital accumulation) while its people (apart from a privileged class) and the environment do badly, is never examined."[15] In the Japan of today, the reality for an overwhelming majority of Japanese citizens is "precarious, disconnected, and seemingly future-less." Understanding this is crucial to seeing the position of the precariat as an intersection of economic and social issues.[16] Harvey's understanding of reality parallels Koizumi's unrelenting call for reforms, where privatization was specifically prioritized while human issues affecting Japan's citizens (population decline, crime, suicide and mental health) were not discussed.

In addition to this, the results of neoliberal reforms championed by Koizumi and his successors in the Liberal Democratic Party are plainly seen today. A marker of the economic stagnation that created the irregular workers is the shrinking of Japan's manufacturing sector by four million jobs. They were either relocated elsewhere (referred to as the hollowing out of industry) or transformed into temporary jobs, to be "outsourced," done by various sorts of irregular labor.[17]

Freeters

Japan is the site of a specific labor-type-turned-social-identity, hereafter referred to as "freeters." This term originated in a combination of the words "free" (English) and "Arbeiter" (the German word for worker).[18] Freeters

are one type of precariat identified by Amamiya Karin. They are an integral part of an irregular workforce contending with post-bubble socioeconomic concerns. In general, freeters are part-time workers ranging from the ages of 15 to 34.[19] Distinctive from many of their Western counterparts, freeters in Japan are not part-time employees balancing work with the pursuit of an education. With the consideration of a neoliberal global market that oversees an increase and encourages participation in the irregular workforce, freeters are the "posterchild of today's structural precarity" and victims of "economic recession, company restructuring, and the increasingly neoliberal economy."[20]

Due to prosperous economic conditions, the freeter worked in the burgeoning bubble economy (before it burst in the late 1980s), where young people were able to defer entry into the workforce for the pursuit of personal goals.[21] Ken, a 24-year-old freeter, had aspirations to become a musician and keep his practice of music close to his core identity.[22] This seemed functional because the ability to address the needs of the self was satisfied in a socially accepted way, while an open job market readily awaited. However, after the economic bubble burst, general policy by corporations in the 1990s had shifted to "favour retention of experienced workers over employing new untested graduates." This was strategic, so that younger employees and graduates could be utilized on an at-will basis as part-time labor to "fill in the gaps" of the employed permanent labor without being tied down to an unmanageable roster size.[23] Before the bubble burst, these part-time workers were not anxious about their new employment arrangements. Freeters were "initially taken as representative of politically-informed trends towards freedom of choice in a buoyant economy."[24] However, mindful now of the reality that finding a job as an irregular worker at an older age has become increasingly difficult, Ken states, "I have to be realistic. I can't keep trying to make it big forever, so we'll see what happens...If I don't start getting successful by the time I'm 26 I'll have to start looking at regular jobs."[25]

Located outside the bonded ideas of salaried employment, masculinity, and maturity, the freeter (especially the male freeter) is the embodied antithesis of the sararīman (salaryman) and of masculine personhood in contemporary Japan. That is, freeters "have a negative self-image which is exacerbated by women and non-freeters because of the knowledge that their ability to form a family is limited."[26] Being a male freeter involves dealing with the additional tensions of planning a family and meeting predetermined masculine identities. Thus, interviewed women freeters were inclined to deny male freeters as serious romantic partners, given the precarity they would bring to their relationship and future family. Yoshio, another freeter, cited the necessity of a stable path to reach the next step of his romantic relationship with his current girlfriend.[27] This interplay between social intimacy and economic security is one of the complexities of life that many in Japan find unbearable.

Freeters, who struggle both socially and financially, are presented with a classic double-bind dilemma: not aspiring to live up to the expectations of traditional workers continues to deny the hegemonic masculinity of the salaryman and thus limits the extent to which a status of full adulthood can be achieved. This can be seen in Yoshio's anxieties which are tied to his work status and romantic relationship. On the other hand, attempting to transition to "traditional" salaried work implies some extent of sacrifice of self, as seen by Ken giving himself a time limit in which he would give up his musical aspirations. To complicate things, this sought-after solution for social and economic precarity—finding full-time employment—may not be possible, because the "regular employment market continues to have clear age-grades and cut-off points despite the increased precarity of youth employment, making it difficult for freeters in their late 20s and 30s to find full-time work."[28]

Freeters function in a neoliberal structure as a "reserve army" of labor, and they are able "to be moved about, exploited, and cut loose and sacked when it suits employers, who are not required to make any provision for their health or welfare. They earn about half the salary of regular workers, or over a lifetime about a quarter; they are the new poor."[29] They are the disillusioned youth in Japan.

Noise: Characteristics and Practices

The precarious existence of freeters in Japan today can be foiled with a genre of music that, since the collapse of the bubble economy in the 1980s, has come to be a significant force in the avant-garde music scene: noise music. The relationship between freeters and full-time workers (now able to be thought of as the salaryman) can be likened to the relationship between noise and music. Both seem to function as opposites within their respective pairs. Yet, a cross-comparison that establishes a relationship between irregular labor and noise can be made. This comparison looks at the precariat freeter as an embodiment of noise, and noise as an embodiment of the precarious characteristics of the freeter.

As many people are far removed from the obscure genre of noise music, it may be hard to recognize the significance of this avant-garde performance art, especially as it relates to precarious labor and neo-liberal economic policies in modern-day Japan. As such, reactions towards noise are likely to be negative in nature: the unusual "off-the-wall" and non-traditional sounds which people are unaccustomed to hearing create unease and discomfort with many who experience it. Popular media outlets such as YouTube may at one time have served as one's only opportunity for any immersion in this form of music that occupies the edge of listenability and consumerability. Additionally, there is almost no public or popular discourse concerning noise. A quick search with the query "noise music" may result in a handful of videos attempting to explain the genre as well as a few selections from more well-known artists. One must

have prior knowledge of the genre to make sense of such unspecialized search results, for the substance of noise is masked by its lack of mainstream recognition, a commonality between noise and the precariat freeter. Delving into the scene of noise can be confusing, indeterminate, and complex, while the existence of the precariat freeter—characterized by disconnectedness and complexity—incites Durkheim's notion of social anomie. The complexities of navigating such an existence, as explored before by Rosenbaum in the previous pages, led some to opt out completely of participation.

What appeal, if any, could a towering wall of sound, a deafening barrage of roars, whoops, and screeching brought on by a tangled maze of electronic equipment and wires have to a listener? The recognition and acknowledgement of the significance of the cacophony of noise created by distortion pedals and positive feedback loops becomes lost in itself and in the obscurity of the practice and consumption of noise. Resulting from this disconnection is the continued existence of noise as an exotic, foreign, and aloof musical or performative concept. This "otherness" draws interest from those outside the listening base with its theatrical aspects and ear-jarring sound, yet it is this same attractive exoticness that masks the significances and nuances of noise's production and consumption. While overlooked by the populace, the existence of noise music can be understood as both the human mind's fascination with technological creation and misuse and a yearning to make sense of the increasing tension in a neoliberal, global society.

Klett and Gerber categorize sound into two categories: noise and music, which function as opposites. While music is generally pleasing to the ear, being harmonious and resonant, noise is described as chaotic and unfamiliar.[30] Ultimately, noise music is the combination of these two categories of sound that can be "characterized by abrasive frequencies and profuse volume. Few would disagree that the genre can be harsh, discordant, [and] unlistenable."[31] Similarly, in the negative beauty that is the "noise experience," words such as でかい (*dekai*, enormous), 大きい (*ookii*, big), and 強い (*tsuyoi*, powerful or strong) can be used in an attempt to describe the raw nature of the sound that is characteristic of noise.[32] Noise is inherently more than just the physical sound occurring. As with other music, visceral responses are emitted, but almost as a response to the raw nature of the sound described above. The complete immersion in mass volume is an intensely personal encounter, one that is unlike any other musical interaction. Some describe shows as brutal or painful, and performers tend to convey actions, emotions and responses such as pain, illness, and violence.[33] A sense of "liveness" is invoked in the raw, primal, emotional nature of sound, and it is this liveness that "becomes a totally individuated experience of sound that cannot be translated to others. Its modes of listening detach from normative social contexts of musical appreciation."[34] Noise is an experience that is hard to recreate outside of the original context.

Upon listening to noise, one can quickly pick up on the acoustic characteristics described above: *dekai*, *ookii*, and *tsuyoi* are all powerful descriptors of sound, even if the consumption of the sound is not live. Listening to Hijokaidan's album *Romance*, the first sound that one hears (at 0:02 seconds) is a tonal screeching combined with a white noise not unlike one might hear from a poor TV signal.[35] Listening closely, unsettling muffled screams can be heard beneath this initial roar as an extremely high pitched ringing supersedes the noise that is already established (at approximately 1:40 seconds).[36] Listening to audio samples can be extremely flat, especially when put in comparison to live music which involves intangible elements of performance and immersion.

Regarding live performances of noise, perhaps the next closest substitute are recordings and videos of live performances, which encapsulate all the harsh realities of noise. Here, dekai, ookii, and tsuyoi may take on different meanings as aural noise is supplemented and sometimes overtaken by visual and physical occurrences. Novak's first encounter with Japanese noisician (noise musician), Masonna, left him utterly confused and speechless as the artist contorted his body and flailed onstage. While familiar with similar stage theatrics, the intense physical action combined with extensive voice distortion gave such a unique edge to this performance, leaving Novak drained.[37] The result of these combined aspects allowed Masonna to essentially become noise, as "his shouts became clipped bursts of overloaded sound, doubled and extended by a delay that displaced the sounds into stuttered blasts of static. [...] his voice was distortion, and distortion was his voice."[38] In this same manner, a video of Masonna's performance at the festival *Beyond Innocence* in Osaka details a roughly 3-minute performance that can be characterized by sporadic bursts of violent thrashing and screaming. He stumbles clumsily around the stage, entangling himself in wires and immersing himself in static before collapsing onto the floor and yelling into the microphone for the first of many times. This sort of sporadic bursting action continues as Masonna continues to intermittently shout into the microphone while stumbling and flailing about onstage, pulling wires and knocking over equipment. The performance seems to end when the noisician leaves the stage, yet the theatrical acts continue as he pushes through the crowd, where he eventually stumbles and falls off a ledge.[39] Noise is still engulfing the room at this point. The equipment and technology used to create the flurry of static and distortion has not been disconnected or turned off.

Comparatively, Japanese noise musician, Merzbow, does not seem to engage with these dissonant physical acts or stage theatrics. His setup in a specific performance, which consists of a soundboard, mixer, and a maze of wires surrounded by towers of amplifiers, is rather tame in comparison to Masonna's performance.[40] He wears a homemade device which in general might resemble the shape of a banjo, but is actually a metal plate with metal springs strapped across it (which he strums at different points). His actions are seemingly methodological and calculated as he calmly twists

knobs, changes settings, and moves equipment around. In fact, the sound emitted from the twisted heap of technology at the beginning is pleasant, and it is the only sound for the first twenty seconds of footage. Once he begins sliding and turning knobs and dials, however, a harsher, piercing screech begins to take over. For 21 minutes, this aural assault continues, only lessened by brief changes in settings before another harsh sound takes over, which is somehow the same and yet different from the sound before it.[41]

Like freeter work, noise groups can function on an irregular basis. Hijokaidan effectively embodies the irregular existence of the freeter, for "drawing from the loose collective at Drugstore, [Hijokaidan] was composed of a large and flexible group of members, some making sounds, others doing actions."[42] Members came and went in a similar fashion to how corporations employed freeters on a part-time and fleeting basis.

The Noise of Modern Society

Many theoretical connections can be made between the world and the existence of noise. Novak, in his ethnography, creates links between noise and post-war Japan along with the associated notions of globalization, technoculture, modernity, nuclear toxicity, and—of course—the freeter.[43]

If one views the above noise examples as parallel to trends of growth within society, an outlook on noise then takes a reflective turn. Novak notes that "the impact of an overpowering mechanical environment has been associated with industrial modernity [...] The sudden violence of mechanical noise was symbolized by its spectacular relationship with the explosive growth of cities, factories, and technological warfare."[44] Here, noise functions as a representation of the growth of society in post-war Japan and attempts to reconcile with and come to terms with the noise that is inherent in this new reality. Murasaki Hyakurō, a noise fan, was able to find meaning in listening to noise by relating it to his experiences working with deafening machines at an industrial flour mill. Novak uses this as testimony to the notion of technological violence, a characteristic of modern industrial production. Murasaki wanted to offset the effects of working in an industrial setting, where he was continually and unwillingly subjected to noise that penetrated and distorted his mind and soul. Thus, he regained control over his body by choosing to override the unwanted noise within him with a more substantial noise, something he accomplished through the attendance of noise concerts.[45]

For Attali, music "reflects the manufacture of society; [and] constitutes the audible waveband of the vibrations and signs that make up society. An instrument of understanding, it prompts us to decipher a sound form of knowledge."[46] Noise, in

the context of Novak and Murasaki, is able to be understood as a tool to internally reconcile the hardships of industrialization that is so characteristic of modern society.

As the industrial conditions that Murasaki found himself in were deafening, so too are the conditions of Japanese youth. Grinding flour machines are replaced with a lack of social and economic progression, yet noise remains as the constant presence and source of tension for the individual.

Resistive Noise and Music in Japan and Beyond

Merzbow holds noise to a different, more subversive standard and function. While noise for Murasaki provided a method of adaptation, relief, and understanding, noise to Merzbow is a subversive form of art. Originally a project to "help unravel the social effects of Japanese consumerism," noise acts as a method of secret communication, a way to "hide something in the media."[47] For Merzbow, subverting large scale Japanese consumer society simply relied on intense personal experience with noise, not unlike what Novak experienced and detailed. This includes making "independent sense of [...] advanced technological society," as well as starting an underground communications revolution that ironically turns technology against itself.[48]

This is not the first time that music has functioned as a mode of resistance; there is ample precedent sustaining certain genres of Japanese music as resistant to oppression. In the case of Okinawan popular music, referred to as Uchinaa, the practice, performance, and consumption acts as a powerful tool in securing and legitimizing the minority Okinawan identity amidst national and global currents of oppression. Oppression can be resisted in many ways, physical conflict and strife being the most prominent. However, another form of resistance is, as evident in the context of Uchinaa pop and noise, through the practice of syncretic music. Uchinaa music combines folk and Western styles, ideas, and instrumentations, resulting in what is easily overlooked as 'catchy exotic music' with a "colorful 'ethnic' appeal."[49] Certainly the significance of unfamiliar music can get lost in the anthropological "other." It is important to recognize Okinawan music as a means by which to craft and solidify an identity that exists on the periphery of national and popular discourses of identity and culture. The hybridization that is integral to the identity of Uchinaa Pop is crucial in the forming of Uchinaa as a tool of resistance against mainstream Japan, an assertion made clear through a comprehensive analysis of the concept of mixing. In response to a United States air base located on Okinawa that fills the space with the constant deafening noise of jet engines, Uchinaa also embodies critical attitudes towards Western presences and influence. For example, in the music video for the song "You You You," a U.S. fighter jet is emblazoned overtop of cheerful pop music in the background before an abundance of the Chinese character for "world" shows on-screen.[50]

Outside of the context of noise and Uchinaa in Japan, music has historically embodied the spirit of resistance, and continues to do so contemporarily. Considering that popular movements of music of the 1960s and 1970s in the United States coincided with changing political attitudes, it makes sense that both noise and Uchinaa hold political consciences. In the case of 1960s America, with rock singers came "a wider revolution of consciousness and culture, of which political revolution would come as a by-product."[51] That is, with rock music came a critical conscience towards foreign policy and wars.

At first glance, this new culture can be written off as drug users, "speed freaks [...] acid heads" showing up to a Stones' concert and being part of the demographic of associated casualties, a reason for poorly-held views of said culture.[52] This culture, however, possesses a political consciousness and is important to contextualize amidst the global political and military climate of the time. As Hodgson states, 1965 to 1968 witnessed a polarization in the United States due to an increased unity in the counterculture. Those involved in the culture in the casual sense—the rock singers, listeners, cannabis users— "felt themselves part of the same great army as those who went to jail for resisting the draft or dropped out to work for radical political change."[53]

This example from a non-Japanese context serves to strengthen the claim that resistance through sound is not an inherently Japanese phenomenon, nor is it entirely new either. The American folk and rock climate of the 1960s is certainly imbued with political meaning in a similar sense to that of Japanese noise, and connections can be made between the drug-user and rock aficionado affected by foreign policy towards Vietnam and the disillusioned Japanese irregular worker affected by neoliberal policy that has left them without a means to secure full adulthood. In some senses, both policies proved or continue to prove lethal, as exemplified by the rising suicide figures that refuse to be addressed in Japan.

Conclusion

This article began with a presentation of the social and economic landscape of contemporary Japan as a framework upon which to discuss the two central topics of Japanese irregular labor, known as freeters, and the avant-garde genre of noise music. An understanding of the freeter as an enactment of the Japanese precariat—ultimately an adaptation of Marx's proletariat—is fashioned through a historical timeline that showcases post-war Japan from the time immediately following the end of the second World War up through the bursting of Japan's Bubble Economy. The effect that the worsening economy and implemented neoliberal reforms by Prime Minister Koizumi has on the freeter is laid out and mental health is discussed. From here, the freeter is characterized as an isolated figure that faces extreme hardship in both an economic and social sense in a new Japan that does not recognize

their existence. In these discussions of the freeter, a connection is made to the second main idea of this article, where it is said that both the freeter and noise are antithetical in their own respective fields. The irregular freeter is the foil to the full time and masculine salaryman, while noise is everything that music is not. Additional connections are made, suggesting that freeters may very well be considered noise in the neoliberal structure that they exist in.

From here, noise is introduced through some generalized characteristics and some prominent historical figures in its production and performance in Japan as a framework upon which to discuss the resistive capacities that lie within noise and other genres of music, such as Uchinaa and American rock. Uchinaa, a type of Okinawan popular music, holds within it a political consciousness that both noise and American rock have. American rock and the segment of American history that is characterized by a creation of a counterculture complete with recreational drugs and rejection of foreign policy interests serves to broaden the contextualization of resistance from Japan to a more global level. From here, freeters and noise are not just an isolated Japanese phenomenon, but instead are swept up in the globally pervasive human ability to imbed resistive capacity within sound, regardless of the organization of those sound waves. Through all of this, two constants can be identified: regardless of whose face is on the body of the precariat, neoliberal and global policy proves in history and the present day that tension always exists within those bodies that the policies enact their power on. Additionally, sound and music will always be able to be looked towards as a site where this tension and resistance can be manifested.

Morgan House

Class of 2017

Endnotes

1. In this article, Japanese names follow the traditional order of last name first.
2. Brett Walker, *A Concise History of Japan* (Cambridge University Press, 2015), 272.
3. Igarashi Yoshikuni, *Bodies of Memory: Narratives of War in Postwar Japanese Culture, 1945-1970* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 146.
4. Walker, *Concise History*, 282.
5. Christopher Perkins, "Part-timer, Buy a House: Middle-class Precarity, Sentimentality and Learning the Meaning of Work," 64-85, in Kristina Iwata-Weickgenannt and Roman Rosenbaum, eds., *Visions of Precarity in Japanese Popular Culture and Literature* (New York: Routledge, 2015), 68.
6. Gavan McCormack, "Koizumi's Kingdom of Illusion," *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 3, no. 11 (November 2005), unpaginated.
7. Ibid.
8. Romit Dasgupta, *Re-reading the Salaryman in Japan: Crafting Masculinities* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 157.
9. Amamiya Karin, "Suffering Forces Us to Think Beyond the Left-Right Barrier," *Mechademia* 5 (2010): 252.
10. Ibid., 252.
11. Dasgupta, Re-Reading the Salaryman, 157.
12. *Japan Times*, "Man arrested for fatal stabbing in Osaka", 2016.
13. Roman Rosenbaum, "Graphic Representations of the Precariat in Popular Culture," 132-151, in Kristina Iwata-Weickgenannt and Roman Rosenbaum, eds., *Visions of Precarity in Japanese Popular Culture and Literature* (New York: Routledge, 2015), 148.
14. Amamiya, "Suffering Forces to Think," 256.
15. David Harvey, *Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution* (London: Verso, 2014), 29.
16. Dasgupta, *Re-Reading the Salaryman*, 157.
17. McCormack, "Koizumi's Kingdom of Illusion," unpaginated.
18. Perkins, "Part-timer, Buy a House," 68.
19. Emma Cook, "Expectations of Failure: Maturity and Masculinity for Freeters in Contemporary Japan," *Social Science Japan Journal* 16 (2013): 29.
20. Ibid., 29.
21. Perkins, "Part-timer, Buy a House," 68.
22. Cook, "Expectations of Failure," 35.
23. Perkins, "Part-timer, Buy a House," 68.
24. Ibid., 68.
25. Cook, "Expectations of Failure," 35.
26. Ibid., 31.
27. Ibid., 36.
28. Ibid., 35.
29. McCormack, "Koizumi's Kingdom of Illusion," unpaginated.
30. Joseph Klett and Alison Gerber, "The Meaning of Indeterminacy: Noise Music as Performance," *Cultural Sociology* 8 (2014): 275.

31. Ibid., 275.
32. David Novak, Japanoise (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013), 47.
33. Ibid., 47.
34. Ibid., 47.
35. "Hijokaidan – Romance," timestamp 0:02, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9SYe5B9OljQ.
36. Ibid., timestamp 1:40.
37. Novak, *Japanoise*, 45.
38. Ibid., 45.
39. "Masonna Festival Beyond Innocence, Bridge, Osaka 2002 Japanoise," timestamp 2:52, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ylDuOmEoZx0.
40. "Merzbow Boiler Room Tokyo Live Set," https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fR_8gpJCT4I.
41. Ibid.
42. Novak, *Japanoise*, 110.
43. Ibid., 189.
44. Ibid., 181.
45. Ibid., 182.
46. Jacques Attali, *Noise: The Political Economy of Music* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004), 4.
47. Novak, *Japanoise*, 192.
48. Ibid., 192.
49. James Roberson, "Uchinaa Pop: Place and Identity in Contemporary Okinawan Popular Music," *Critical Asian Studies* 33 (2001), 211.
50. "*Rinken bando* You You You PV 1993," timestamp 1:04, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=noSEaznupdg.
51. Godfrey Hodgson, *America in Our Time* (Princeton University Press, 1976), 336.
52. Ibid., 338.
53. Ibid., 349.

Ian Lazarenko

Human Dust: General Wrangel and the Russian Exiles

Following the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, Russia plunged into disarray. Numerous military factions formed in resistance to the new Bolshevik government, the largest being the Don Cossack host. The Cossack's territory became a stronghold for those opposed to the Bolsheviks and their Red Army, and the Don region was soon populated by numerous military leaders from the old Tsarist army.[1] Former Tsarist generals, Mikhail Alekseev and Lavr Kornilov, upon their arrival to the Don region, formed a Volunteer Army to launch armed resistance against the Bolshevik Red Army. By 1919, the Volunteer Army had grown to over 100,000 in strength — half of the army consisting of the Don Cossacks — and had become one of the central forces of the White movement.[2] The Whites — possibly named to contrast with the Bolshevik Reds — were a loose confederation of anti-Bolshevik forces under the leadership of former Tsarist officers, with the most significant forces belonging to "Admiral Aleksandr Kolchak in Siberia, of Lieutenant General Evgenii Miller in the far north of Russia, of General-of-Infantry Nikolai Iudenich in Estonia."[3] The White movement was not a centralized resistance to the Bolsheviks, with each officer differing in political ideology or in treatment of peasant populations. This lack of unity would prove to be the downfall of the White armies, and would continue long after the Civil War had ended.

Leadership of the Volunteer Army passed to General Anton Ivanovich Denikin following the deaths of General Kornilov, who was killed in combat in April 1919, and General Alekseev, who died of cancer in October 1918.[4] General Denikin, rather than connecting his forces with those of Admiral Kolchak, ordered the White forces under the command of General Pyotr Wrangel to march on Moscow. The attempt to seize the capital city was disastrous, and it soiled the relationship between Denikin and Wrangel.

Pyotr Nikolayevich Wrangel was a Russian military leader and baron of aristocratic Baltic-German background, his father being a close associate of the Tsar and European nobility.[5] Wrangel was educated to be a mining technician and could, therefore, relate more to the working classes than could the rest of his family.[6] He was a career officer in the Imperial Army, serving in both the Russo-Japanese War and the First World War. Wrangel retired to Crimea following the end of Russia's involvement in the global conflict, but joined the Volunteer Army in the aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution. Wrangel proved to be an effective leader and military strategist, and did not condone looting by

his soldiers. Despite his successes, including the capture of Tsaritsyn, Wrangel was discharged by Denikin in the aftermath of the advance on Moscow in 1919 due to intense disputes about who was to be blamed for the failure of the White Army to capture the city.[7] The Moscow disaster allowed for the Red Army to push the Whites back into Ukraine and effectively turned the tide of the war against the White Army. On April 3, 1920, General Denikin relinquished his commission and steamed across the Black Sea, exiling himself in Constantinople.[8]

Following Denikin's retreat, Wrangel returned to Ukraine and, at the behest of an officer's council, he took control of the remainder of the White Army. Wrangel became the de facto leader of Ukraine, and although a monarchist, he enacted leftist policies such as land reform and autonomy for the native Cossacks, utilizing former socialist economic advisors to do such.[9] This was an attempt to improve the standing of the Whites compared to the Bolsheviks among the peasantry.[10] In August, Wrangel received the full support of the French government, including recognition as the Russian head-of-state.[11] Western recognition legitimized Wrangel and his causus belli against the Bolsheviks, as the Bolshevik government had yet to be recognized by any major Western power.[12] The British, however, encouraged the General to end hostilities against the Bolshevik government. Prime Minister Lloyd George believed that Moscow could eventually be reasoned with and controlled, and he did not follow the French in recognizing Wrangel's government.[13] When the General refused to end hostilities, and instead proceeded to launch an offensive against the Red Army, Britain cut off relations with Wrangel's forces.[14] Despite French recognition and the support of some of the Allied powers, Wrangel soon realized that the fight would prove fruitless. The Red Army had penetrated his positions, flooding into the Crimean Peninsula, and his men were in no condition to put up a major fight.[15] Should the White Army have remained in place, the last vestige in the fight against Bolshevism would have been destroyed.

Facing certain defeat at the hands of approaching Bolshevik soldiers, on November 11, 1920, Wrangel began the evacuation of his men from Crimea towards Constantinople.[16] In addition to his men, thousands of refugees flooded the streets of Sevastopol attempting to secure their spot on a vessel.[17] Despite the large numbers of people and ships involved — over 150,000 refugees — the evacuation was orderly and completed in only five days.[18] Over one hundred Allied and White naval ships participated in the evacuation effort, with the Allied support coming mainly from France. Britain, having ended relations with Wrangel during his August offensive, provided no naval support.[19] Vice Admiral McCully, the senior American commander in the region, provided what he could without waiting for orders from Washington.[20]

The White Army ended up in different areas in and around Constantinople, and faced relocation by the Allied forces. The soldiers, spread out in camps at Constantinople, Lemnos, Gallipoli, and Chatalga, contin-

ued to be commanded to some degree by the army structure that was present in Crimea.[21] Above all, Wrangel always ensured that he remained the central leading figure among the White Army émigrés. Still bearing French recognition as the legitimate Russian government, Wrangle believed that he should be the one to unite all Russians living in exile in Europe.

Wrangel and his men were not the only Russian political remnant that fled to Europe. A multitude of Russians fled in the years immediately following the 1917 revolutions, and strong émigré communities had already formed in Berlin and Paris. Regarding the terms 'émigré' versus 'refugee' or 'exile', many White Army soldiers and civilians described themselves as the former. One soldier said that the army was "...in voluntary exile, but the years of our enforced presence abroad have not turned us into 'refugees'... We are still irreconcilable political émigrés and our struggle with the worldwide red danger continues."[22] This reflected a strong belief among the White Army émigrés that the exile was temporary, and that they would be able to return to a Bolshevik-free Russia one day. The degree to which émigrés advocated for such a change, or even hoped to return, greatly varied among the larger exiled community. The ideological differences can be organized into groups: aktivizm, in which émigrés advocated for extreme action against the Soviet rule; those who argued for a democratic or for a monarchist government were known as predreshenchestvo, or as nepredreshenchestvo if they believed the new government should be chosen by the Constituent Assembly; primirenie were émigrés that returned to Russia (and were criticized as Bolshevik sympathizers, or bolshevizanstvo); nevozvrashchentsy were those who settled in their new lands; priznanie and nepriznanie were those that recognized or did not recognize the Soviet regime, respectively.[23]

There are many notable examples such as Marie Balasheff, who eventually settled in the French countryside, had been a member of the Russian nobility before her escape in 1919 or 1920.[24] Balasheff believed that the Russian people would one day overthrow Bolshevism, and that émigrés should one day return when that time had come. She did not, however, believe that it was the duty of the émigrés to overthrow Bolshevism themselves. She stated that "It is for the country and not for a crowd of refugees to decide on the future form of government... every émigré should cling to the hope of serving his country some day and prepare himself to this end as far as he is able..."[25] She could be described as a nevozvrashchentsy - a non-returnee, and even as a nepredreshenchestvo — those who wanted to 'wait and see' if Bolshevism would end on its own. Similarly, Alexander Alland and Abraham Gootnick, two Russian Jews living in Ukraine and Russia, were able to use their own wealth to pay for safe passage to Constantinople and then to elsewhere, separate from the White Army.[26] Once they escaped Russia, they never looked back — reflecting nevozvrashchensty.

For all intents and purposes, Wrangel's retreat marked the defeat of the White Army in Russia. In the hearts and minds of the exiled officers and soldiers, however, the war had yet to conclude. The White Army, after all, was largely still intact. From the moment he began his retreat, Wrangel was preparing for the day he would return with his army to defeat Bolshevism once and for all. Speaking to the Associated Press shortly after landing in Constantinople, Wrangel stated:

> My army and navy are prepared to begin again the struggle immediately... Russia cannot remain Bolshevist. The country is impoverished, the workers are starved, and the peasants are being robbed. Conditions are such that collapse is inevitable. Bolshevism is not supported by the mass of Russians, who are under a terror that is perfectly organized and do not dare to resist without assistance from the outside, which is absolutely essential to the re-establishment of a democratic government.[27]

This belief guided all of the actions Wrangel and his government-in-exile took during the 1920's. To Wrangel, Bolshevism was merely a temporary setback in Russian history, and the status quo would be restored. To defeat Bolshevism, Wrangel believed that as the sole leader of the White Army and as the only recognized leader of Russia he needed to unite the Russian émigrés under his leadership. In order for him to succeed, Wrangel needed to address the great political diversity in the émigré community and maintain his support in the French government.

As Robinson states, no one outside of the White Army believed that Wrangel should take the reins as head of the émigré community.[28] Despite his attempts at unification, Wrangel was unable to gain recognition, both from the Western countries and from the other exiled Russians, as the sole leader of the Russian émigrés living in Europe. Wrangel's inability to keep his French recognition soiled his claims as a universal Russian leader, and he was unable to stop the polarization of the émigré community due to the ideological differences between himself and the rest of the exiled Russians. The quarrelling of the émigrés allowed for the gradual acceptance of the Soviet regime by the Western nations, cementing the defeat of Bolshevism's enemies abroad.

Upon arrival in Turkey, the White Army was composed of shattered, starving soldiers ridden with disease and broken hearts. To make matters worse, the situation in Constantinople was nearly as dire for the locals as it had been for the soldiers in Crimea. Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Turkish nationalists led by Mustafa Kemal began a conquest of the Anatolian lands now controlled by Greece, Armenia, and the Allied powers.[29] Kemal had his sights on the former Ottoman capital, which was weakly administered and defended by the Allies. The refugees created by Kemal's conquests only

added to the hundreds of thousands of Russian émigrés in Constantinople and the Balkans.[30] Worse still, Kemal allied himself with the Bolshevik government and would later expel the majority of Russian émigrés from Turkey.[31] Wrangel and his men entered into this chaos, hungry for both food and victory.

Wrangel's men were sent to various refugee camps, largely on the Gallipoli peninsula and the island of Lemnos.[32] With the soldiers receiving aid from various nations and organizations, and with military leadership relatively intact,[33] Wrangel believed that whatever money and supplies the émigré community had at large should be spent towards the preservation of the White Army.[34] In order to increase his standing and influence throughout Europe, Wrangel sent delegations to the major European capitals. There, these delegates communicated with the émigré communities, acted as a contact between Wrangel and prominent émigré figures, coordinated aid efforts, and interacted with governments. If the capital lacked a significant White Army émigré population, Wrangel's delegates were often seen as secondary to the Russian ambassadors or émigré leaders already present in that country.[35] This was the case with Wrangel's French delegation in Paris, where an established liberal émigré elite clashed with the monarchism of the White Army.[36]

Paul Robinson argues that the two most dividing differences between the military and the liberal émigrés were the beliefs in gosudarstvennost, which means "statehood," versus obshchestvennost, which means "public opinion."[37] The White Army remnants largely favored the power of the state, and believed that the revolutions had destroyed the last legitimate Russian government — the Imperial government. To them, it was their duty to restore statehood in Russia. Many of the military elites even called themselves gosudarstvenno-mysliashchie liudi, or "state-minded people," to represent their dedication to Russian statehood.[38] Conversely, many liberal émigrés and exiled intelligentsia believed that the state should yield to society, and that they, as the most educated members of society, should choose what form of government Russia should have.[39] Wrangel's sense of duty to the fallen Tsarist regime clashed with the democratic idealism of the liberals in Paris.

Paris was unique in that it was the home to many officials of the former Provision Government, and exiled members of the Constituent Assembly met there in January of 1921 to address, among other things, Wrangel's evacuation.[40] Some Kadet politicians in Paris believed that the émigré community as a whole must unite around Wrangel in order to prevent the Western nations from recognizing a Bolshevik victory. I.V. Kliuchnikov protested, saying that the Parisian émigrés would do better than to unite around "human dust," referring to Wrangel's shattered forces.[41] Paris was also the home of Ambassador Maklakov, who controlled a large amount of Russian state funds held in the embassy. Wrangel sent a delegation in an attempt to win the favor of the ambassador and gain access to the funds for use of the army.[42] Maklakov,

however, did not recognize Wrangel's government, and refused to cooperate with the general. Instead, he decided to centralize his own power and influence over the émigré community. Maklakov called together Mikhail Girs and Boris Bakhmeteff, the other Russian ambassadors in Paris, on February 2, 1921. The three men decided that they were the sole representation of the Russian government in exile, not Wrangel.[43] They believed, based on their liberal ideology, that the army was too expensive to maintain and that armed struggle against the Bolshevik government would not renew as it had during the Civil War. Maklakov himself, in response to Wrangel's evacuation, had said that "...there are other ways besides the use of arms and munitions in which the Bolsheviki can be put down, and perhaps the fight will continue along bloodless."[44] Maklakov became the head of the Conference of Ambassadors, which claimed to be the de jure remnant of the Russian government.

Even with the entirety of the White Army under his control, Wrangel did not have the monetary strength nor the public support that the Conference held. In Berlin, where the Conference of Ambassadors' delegate, S. D. Botkin, had established himself as the primary Russian representative in the city, Wrangel's delegate, A. E. Rimsky-Korsakov, took the back burner. The Ambassadors were more easily able to maneuver in the established émigré communities, having already made names for themselves in the European capitals.[45] This was a recurring theme in France, where Wrangel wielded little influence compared to Maklakov. The Conference itself was diverse in membership, including monarchist, socialist, and republican émigrés within its ranks, and the Conference failed to gain the full support of the Western governments due to the internal divisions this caused.[46] Sidelined in the political world by the Ambassadors, Wrangel attempted to take control of the aid efforts headed by Russian émigrés. Such organizations included the Russian Red Cross, the Union of Cities, or Vserossiiskii Soiuz Gorodov (VSG), the Union of Towns, or Vsreossiiskii Zemskii Soiuz (VZS), and the Zemstvo and Towns Relief Committee, known as Zemgor.

Following their Paris meeting in January of 1921, Maklakov and the Conference of Ambassadors convinced the French government to move émigré aid and support into the hands of Zemgor. Zemgor was headed by liberal politicians under the leadership of Prince L'vov, and received sixty percent of its funding from the Conference of Ambassadors. Despite what can be considered as obvious ties to the liberal émigré population, Zemgor repeatedly maintained that it was a politically neutral organization.[47] No matter the official policy of the organization, many Zemgor officials saw the army as a collection of arbitrary and reactionary monarchists, and the organization maintained an official policy that the army should be disbanded.[48] Additionally, Zemgor directed its aid efforts towards civilian refugees, rather than towards the army. Their reasoning for this was that able-bodied officers and soldiers should seek employment and support themselves, while many civilian refugees did not have the same means. This was seen by many in the army as a direct attack on them by

the liberal politicians, and it infuriated the army leadership.[49] Political tensions were already high due to questions over the use of the state reserves and the legitimacy of Wrangel's claim, and the added uncertainty over biased aid distribution only corroded an already frail relationship. Wrangel's relations with the other aid organizations were no better, as the VZS had recognized the authority of the Conference of Ambassadors after Wrangel demanded the right to audit the charity organization's finances.[50] Believing himself and the army to be under attack by the liberal-controlled aid groups, Wrangel formulated a plan to ease tensions and give himself more direct control over the distribution of aid.

In June and August of 1921, Wrangel and representatives from the Russian social organizations met in Constantinople to attempt to unite aid efforts. The military aid units were put under the domain of the Russian Red Cross, but struggles for power between the military units and the social units were not successful, and it instead triggered the dissolution of the temporary union.[51] Not dissuaded, Wrangel again attempted to unite aid efforts by creating the Russian Council. The VZS and VSG aid organizations initially joined membership of the Council, leading to hopes of better relations between Zemgor and the White Army. Wrangel believed that he had finally gained influence over the liberal organizations. Unfortunately for Wrangel, during the first Council elections, right-wing monarchists won a majority of seats. The VSG left the following summer due to these political differences, and Wrangel dissolved the Council shortly after.[52] Wrangel himself was angered by the monarchist majority, as it painted the Council as a right-wing organization rather than a league of united Russian émigré interests. His attempts to unify the aid efforts under his control, thereby removing influence from the liberal émigrés in Paris, had failed. To Wrangel, this failure stemmed from his association with monarchism and right-wing politics.

Wrangel attempted to distance himself from the monarchist label during the early months in exile. In a letter dated January 12, 1921, Wrangel said that "the Army is fighting not for monarchy, not for republic, but for fatherland. It will not support those who wish to impose this or that state order on Russia against the will of the people, but will guard that order which is established by a truly free expression of the national will."[53] Much of the monarchist faction was split between supporters of Nicholas II's uncle, Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, and supporters of his first cousin, Grand Duke Cyril Vladimirovich.[54] Many of the soldiers in the White Army supported Nikolai, as the duke had been commander-in-chief during the First World War.[55] Wrangel was initially hesitant to support Nikolai, as he wanted to remain politically neutral to appease both the émigrés in France and the Western nations, who largely supported the democratic Provisional Government. He argued that any group headed by the Duke would simply devolve into a monarchist faction.[56] Despite this, due to a mounting claimant movement started by Grand Duke Vladimirovich, Wrangel on May 12, 1923 wrote to Nikolaevich announcing his support.[57] He hoped that the Grand Duke would announce his leadership of the emigration, and that royal

support would legitimize the White cause and bring others in support around the army. By this point, however, Wrangel's hopes were no more than pipe dreams. Politically his reach was far less than that of the liberal Ambassadors, who had established themselves throughout Europe years before Wrangel could send delegates abroad. Economically he was tied to the support of the Western governments and the aid organizations controlled by the Ambassadors. Wrangel had failed to diminish the influence held by his liberal foes, and subsequently the two major factions in the émigré community were irreparably split.

Wrangel's problems with France, unfortunately for him, did not end with Maklakov and the Conference of Ambassadors. While he may have never gained the recognition of the liberal émigrés in Paris, Wrangel still held the recognition of the French government. Relations between Wrangel's men and the French government had been strained at best, stemming from the high cost of supporting the White Army for the French, as well as the soldiers' refusals to fully disarm.[58] In order to save relations with France, Wrangel sought to get the White Army out of French dependence. To do such, in early 1921 he asked that the French government relocate his army to Siberia, in order to continue the fight against the Bolshevik government.[59] The French denied his request, and provided his men with three options: find employment in a city with no work to be found, return to Russia, or accept transport to Sao Paulo in Brazil to work as plantation farmers.[60] Wrangel's men, infuriated, began formulating a plot to capture Constantinople. Wrangel himself held direct control of 25,000 soldiers, and twice as many as that could come to his aid should he attack Constantinople (which itself was populated with over a million Russian émigrés).[61] This proved to be the fatal blow for Wrangel's legitimacy, as the French responded by disavowing his claim as the Russian head of state and ceasing all ration distribution to his men.[62] The French, in a note given to the press, stated that "[Wrangel] opposes all measures taken by the French military authorities to end the expenses undertaken for motives of pure humanity. He exercises constant pressure on his soldiers to dissuade them from following our advice and goes so far as to accuse us of giving up his Cossacks to the Bolsheviki and forcing them to return to Russia against their will."[63]

Facing an uproar from both Wrangel and from the Conference of Ambassadors, and being unprepared for an armed insurrection, by May 1921 the French had abandoned their plans to disarm the Russian émigrés and resumed ration distribution to the soldiers.[64] The damage, however, was done. Wrangel had lost the recognition and support of the French government, and with it much of his credibility on the world stage. Without the support of France, Wrangel no longer held that in advantage over the Conference of Ambassadors, nor any other émigré community in Europe or elsewhere.

Wrangel knew that he would have to move his army elsewhere for it to stay together and survive. Mustafa Kemal, the Turkish leader, had previously stated that

all Russian émigrés would be removed from Constantinople once he took charge from the Allied powers.[65] Preparing to emigrate with his army, Wrangel looked west towards Bulgaria and the newly formed Yugoslavia.[66] Wrangel had begun petitioning the two governments during the crisis with France to allow his men to move into their territory. He was successful, and the majority of his men began to migrate to these two countries.[67] Around 40,000 soldiers moved to Yugoslavia, and about 50,000 soldiers went to Bulgaria.[68] Less than a year later, Wrangel's men living in Bulgaria were in serious trouble with the Bulgarian government.

From the beginning of his exile, Wrangel declared his goal to continue to fight against the Bolshevik regime. To do so, he had his men prepare for war against Soviet Russia, often angering the Western governments by forming enclaves where his men listened only to him. In Bulgaria, the government decided that Wrangel had gone too far. Wrangel's men came under suspicions of ransacking farms and robbing civilians in order to gain foodstuffs and other supplies.[69] Even worse accusations came from the Bulgarian Prime Minister, Alexander Stamboulisky, who accused the White Army of plotting a coup against his rule.[70] To prevent conflict between the tens of thousands of White Army soldiers and the fledgling Bulgarian military, Wrangel's forces were ordered to disarm. In October of 1921, the Bulgarian government expelled or arrested all of the White military leadership present in the nation, including General Shyatolif.[71] Should the officers resist, they were shot or, worse, deported to Russia.[72] Without the army leadership present in the country, the rest of Wrangel's men either left to find other soldiers, assimilated, or hopelessly crossed back into Russia, having given up on the White cause. The White Army had now not only been forced out of Russia, but also out of Turkey and Bulgaria. Wrangel's insistence on keeping the White Army together, at any cost, turned the European governments against him. He lost his French recognition in 1921, and now the Bulgarian government denounced him, his army, and his cause. This, coupled with the Conference of Ambassadors refusing to recognize him, ensured that Wrangel's attempts to legitimize his cause and gain the support of the émigré community fell flat.

While his attempts at unification failed, the Soviet government became increasingly relevant in European politics. During the aftermath of the 1921 Kronstadt rebellion, the British government began forming new relations with the Soviets.[73] In 1922, the Soviet government was invited to two European conferences on rebuilding the continent's economy, much to the distress of the émigrés, and following the Rapallo Treaty, the Weimar Republic officially established diplomatic and economic relations with the Soviet government.[74] In February of 1924, the British government officially recognized the Soviet regime, followed by French recognition in October of the same year.[75] Despite being Wrangel's most important ally during his final months in Crimea and the initial resettlement in Turkey, as well as being the center of the

Russian community in exile, France had finally acknowledged the legitimacy of the Soviets. Wrangel was left without any Western government's support, and he was seemingly alone in his battle against Bolshevism in Russia.

The French recognition also affected Maklakov, who up to this point had remained in the Russian embassy in Paris. The Soviet government forced him to vacate the premises, but they could not force Maklakov to give up his influence in French society. Maklakov established the Russian Office in Paris, dedicated to representing the émigré community in France, and continued to be among the most influential Russian politicians living in France.[76] Following the 1932 assassination of President Doumer by a Russian extremist, it was Maklakov who apologized on behalf of the Russian community in France, ensuring their safety in the political aftershocks.[77] Despite numerous setbacks, Maklakov had secured his influence, albeit minute, in French politics for the remainder of his life.[78] The General, on the other hand, was left with no such salvageable reputation among the French political elite. He surely must have known that the émigré community would never fall under his control, so what was Wrangel's goal following initial Soviet acceptance?

Wrangel, now residing in Brussels and having failed to unify the émigré community, made one last attempt to maintain whatever was left of his White Army. In 1923, Wrangel created the Russian All-Military Union, an organization comprised of all living White soldiers, as well as their posterity. Wrangel hoped that the Union, also known as the ROVS, would ensure the livelihood and connectedness of his soldiers as they continued to spread throughout Europe and the rest of the world.[79] The ROVS' Temporary Statute of 1924 stated that:

> The aim of [the] Russian General Military Union is to unite Russian warriors, dispersed in various countries, to strengthen the spiritual link between them, and to preserve them as the bearers of the best traditions and testaments of the old army. ROVS's task is to support soldiers' military knightly spirit, to strengthen the principles of military discipline and military ethics... and also to provide material and moral support to its members.[80]

ROVS provided money, shelter, food, and other means of support to White Army émigrés as they needed. With posts established in most major émigré communities in Europe, Wrangel's attempt to keep the White forces connected had, for the time, succeeded. The organization slowly but surely replaced the High Command as the army leadership, and the White soldiers continued to spread across Europe.[81] After much arguing over whether members should only publicly support the restoration of the monarchy, instead of individual political groups, the ROVS nearly collapsed during its initial years.[82] Its members would never fully state the political goals of the Union, both following the ideas of non-predetermination (nepredreshenchestvo)

and being unable to unify the continuously divided ranks.[83] Although the ROVS survived into the 21st Century, during the interwar period, it quickly became a fragment of itself as the Soviets came to global influence.[84]

Wrangel died of tuberculosis on April 25, 1928 at the age of 49, exactly 10 years and 22 days after he took command of the White Army in Crimea.[85] Initially buried in Brussels, in 1929 he was reburied in Belgrade during a massive ceremony reflecting the grandeur of Imperial Russia. Thousands of émigrés from all of Europe lined the streets, foreign dignitaries paid their respects, and "airplanes circling in a cloudless sky dropped wild flowers before the carriage."[86] Wrangel, despite his failed attempts to unify the émigré community under his wing to fight against the Bolsheviks, was remembered as a hero by those who attended his service.

Wrangel had suffered for just under a month, and came down with a severe cold in the weeks prior to that, but his death was still seen as suspicious. It is still debated as to whether or not the general had been poisoned by the Soviets, the uncertainty stemming in part from his own family's beliefs as well as from the memoirs of Stalin's defected secretary, Boris Bazhanov. Bazhanov claimed that Stalin had ordered Wrangel to be poisoned with new technology the Soviets had developed.[87] Whatever the cause of his untimely death, Wrangel's battle with the Bolsheviks had died in the years prior. He lost his recognition as head of state, was forced to accept the domination of liberal charities, and lost the cohesiveness of his army due to migration or repatriation. Wrangel's failure can be attested to the politically, socially, geographically, and economically divided world of the Russian émigrés in Europe, as well as to his own failures to maintain his legitimacy with the French government. Upon fleeing Russia, rather than unifying against their common Bolshevik enemy, the various groups and organizations continued with the political battles that they had waged in previous years. Wrangel was unable to shake the monarchist label from himself or his White Army, and failed to draw the support of the Conference of Ambassadors and the Western governments to his cause. His failed attempts at émigré unification, seen in his Russian Council and the battles between the French government and the Conference of Ambassadors, bought time for the Soviet government to legitimize itself to France, Britain, and the other Western powers. The Baron General became a lame duck in the political current, continuously drifting further and further from his homeland, left helplessly to watch as the future he had hoped to create withered into the horizon.

Ian Lazarenko

Class of 2020

Endnotes

1. Paul Robinson, *The White Russian Army in Exile 1920-1941* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 3.
2. Ibid., 3–4.
3. Ibid., 3–4.
4. Ibid., 9.
5. It is important to note that I will use the more common version of each individual's name. Instead of "Vrangel," for instance, I will use "Wrangel;" instead of "Vassilii" or "Basil" in regards to Maklakov, I will use "Vasily."
6. Robinson, *The White Russian Army*, 12.
7. Robinson, 14.
8. Charles J. Weeks, "A Samaritan in Russia: Vice Admiral Newton A. McCully's Humanitarian Efforts, 1914-1920," *Military Affairs* 52, no. 1 (1988): 16.
9. Weeks, 16.
10. Robinson, *The White Russian Army*, 13.
11. Robert C. Williams, *Culture in Exile: Russian Emigres in Germany, 1881–1941* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), 102; Robinson, "Zemgor," 720; "Military Aid for Wrangel," *The New York Times*, August 12, 1920.
12. "No Soviet Recognition," *The New York Times*, July 2, 1920.
13. "Wrangel Move Amazes Britain," *The New York Times*, August 12, 1920.
14. Elina Multanen, "British Policy Towards Russian Refugees in the Aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution," *Revolutionary Russia*, 12, no. 1 (1999): 63.
15. Weeks, 16–17.
16. Weeks, 15.
17. Associated Press, "Wrangel Beaten, Takes Refuge on French Warship." *The New York Times,* November 14, 1920.
18. Weeks, 17.; Martyn Housden, "White Russians Crossing the Black Sea: Fridtjof Nansen, Constantinople and the First Modern Repatriation of Refugees Displaced by Civil Conflict, 1922-23." *The Slavonic and East European Review* 88, no. 3 (2010): 497.
19. Multanen, 63.
20. Weeks, 16–17.
21. Robinson, "Zemgor," 720.
22. Robinson, *The White Russian Army*, 21.
23. Elena Chinyaeva, *Russians Outside Russia: The Émigré Community in Czechoslovakia 1918-1938* (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2001), 105–106.
24. Marie Balasheff, *The Transplanting: A Narrative from the Letters of Marie Balasheff, a Russian Refugee in France*, ed. by Martha Genung Stearns (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1928), 18.
25. Balasheff, 222–223.
26. Abraham Gootnick and Janet Levine, "Interview with Dr. Abraham Gootnick," In *Ellis Island Oral History Project*, Series EI, no. 395. (Alexandria, Virginia: Alexander Street Press, 2004), 16–17; Alexander Alland and Edward Appleborn, "Interview of Alexander Alland by Edward Apleborn, June 3, 1986," In *Ellis Island Oral History Project*, Series AKRF, no. 185. (Alexandria, Virginia: Alexander Street Press, 2003), 2.

27. Associated Press, "Wrangel Beaten, Takes Refuge on French Warship." *The New York Times*, November 14, 1920.
28. Robinson, *The White Russian Army*, 64.
29. "Constantinople." *The New York Times*, December 11, 1920.
30. Peter Gatrell, "Nation-States and the Birth of a 'Refugee-Problem' in Interwar Europe," In *The Making of the Modern Refugee* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 53–54.
31. "Paris Dismayed by Overturn," *The New York Times*, November 17, 1920.
32. Housden, 498; Robinson, "Zemgor," 720.
33. There were cases of Cossack leadership (Cossacks made up a majority of the Southern White Army) being able to gain more control over their soldiers once in exile, as Wrangel was not always present. The biggest Cossack group to claim some level of independence were the Don Cossacks. This was not as severe of a problem to Wrangel as starvation or the Conference of Ambassadors, however. See Chinyaeva, 126.
34. Robinson, "Zemgor," 720–721.
35. Marc Raeff, *Russia Abroad: A Cultural History of the Russian Emigration, 1919-1939* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 34.
36. The liberals and the White army often hurled insults at each other, even using their self-given nicknames against them. Elena Chinyaeva states that the term "Wrangelists" did not just apply to those that supported General Wrangel and the White Army, but to anyone who supported the monarchy or "opposed the democratic transformation of Russia". Conversely, those who might be labelled as "Wrangelists" referred to "socialists" or "liberals" as those who seemingly allowed for the Bolsheviks to seize power. See Chinyaeva, 105.
37. Robinson, *The White Russian Army*, 52–53.
38. Robinson, "Zemgor," 720.
39. Robinson, *The White Russian Army*, 53.
40. Robert H. Johnston, *New Mecca, New Babylon: Paris and the Russian Exiles, 1920–1945*, (Montreal: McGrill-Queens University Press, 1988), 59–60.
41. Ibid., 59–60.
42. Robinson, "Zemgor," 721.
43. Ibid., 721.
44. "General Wrangel Safe in Constantinople," *The New York Times*, November 17, 1920.
45. Raeff, 34–35.
46. Johnston, 32–33.
47. Robinson, "Zemgor," 721–722, 726.
48. This reflected Maklakov's belief that armed struggle against the Bolsheviks would be ineffective and dangerous. In 1923, Zemgor even announced support for Nansen's White Army repatriation efforts, infuriating army leadership. See Robinson, "Zemgor," 721–728.
49. Robinson, "Zemgor," 724–725. Aid was also provided indirectly through VZS and VSG, which were under the control of Zemgor.
50. Ibid., 721.
51. Robinson, "Zemgor," 721.
52. Robinson, "Zemgor," 730.
53. Pytor Wrangel, "Correspondence, Wrangel to Kartashev", Russkii Natsional'nyi Komitet Collection, Box 5, Folder (Letter, Wrangel to Kartashev, no. k/580, 12 Jan. 1921). In Robinson, *The White Russian Army*, 117.

54. I will be using Cyril rather than Kirill, which is the spelling used in Robinson's work.
55. Chinyaeva, 120–121.
56. Robinson, *The White Russian Army*, 119.
57. Robinson, *The White Russian Army*, 119.
58. They kept a cache of thousands of rifles and machine guns. See Robinson, *The White Russian Army*, 44.
59. Walter Duranty, "Wrangel Wants Army Put in Siberia," *The New York Times*, April 5, 1921.
60. Ibid.; Robinson, "Zemgor," 727. The French had spent over 300 million Francs towards aid for the White Army, and as they no longer had a credible chance to defeat the Reds France believed that they should no longer have to support them.
61. Duranty, "France Disavows General Wrangel, Fearing a Coup Against Constantinople." *The New York Times*, April 14, 1921.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Despite being starved, often near death, Wrangel's men were able to strengthen themselves to the point where they posed a serious threat to the French forces in Constantinople. As the city was populated largely by Greeks, Wrangel was able to claim that he would defend them from the oncoming Turkish army. See Robinson, *The White Russian Army*, 44–45.
65. Housden, 500; "Ousts White Russians: Governor of Constantinople Orders 2,200 Refugees to Leave." *The New York Times*, August 1, 1927.
66. Robinson, *The White Russian Army*, 45.
67. Robinson, "Zemgor," 729.
68. Ibid., 498.
69. "Says Wrangel Men Menaced Bulgaria," *The New York Times*, May 21, 1922.
70. These fears of a coup could have been justified by the plots to seize Constantinople in the previous year. See Robinson, "Zemgor," 732.
71. "Says Wrangel Men Menaced Bulgaria," *The New York Times*, May 21, 1922; "Wrangel Officers Told They Must Leave Bulgaria," *The New York Times*, October 17, 1922.
72. "Wrangel Officers Told They Must Leave Bulgaria," *The New York Times*, October 17, 1922.
73. Johnston, 60.
74. Ibid.; Raeff, 35.
75. Associated Press. "Britain Recognizes Soviet Government Without Conditions," *The New York Times*, February 2, 1924; Associated Press, "Russians Hail Recognition," *The New York Times*, October 31, 1924.
76. Raeff, 35–36.
77. Ibid., 35–36.
78. Maklakov lived through the Second World War, and was imprisoned for much of the occupation of France by the German army. Following his liberation and the defeat of the Third Reich, Maklakov was criticized by émigrés for celebrating the Soviet contribution to the war effort.
79. Johnston, 101.
80. "BAR, ROVS, Box 161, Folder 'Officers Unions, 1923–1924' (Vremennoe Polozhenie o Russkom Obshche-Voinskom Soiuze, 1 September 1924." In Robinson, *The White Russian Army*, 107.
81. Robinson, *The White Russian Army*, 97.
82. Raeff, 45.

83. Robinson, *The White Russian Army*, 182.
84. Alexi Belkin, *Ofitsial'nyy sayt 1 otdela Russkogo Obshche-Voinskogo Soyuza*, http://www.rovs.narod.ru/.
85. "Gen. Wrangel Dies; Foe of Bolsheviki," *The New York Times*, April 26, 1928.; "Russia's Civil War," The New York Times, April 26, 1928; "Baron Wrangel Reported Sinking," *The New York Times*, April 19, 1928; "Baron Wrangel Slightly Better," *The New York Times*, April 20, 1928.
86. "Wrangel Reburied Amid Czarist Pomp," *The New York Times*, October 7, 1929.
87. While the Soviets had the technological means to infect Wrangel with tuberculosis, historians still debate the legitimacy of Bazhanov's claims. See Robinson, *The White Russian Army*, 129.

Sarah Patarini

Fraternizing in the Face of Femininity: The Fear of Feminization in the Fraternal Order in Victorian Era America

Perhaps the most telling tale of friendship and devotion that has persisted from time immemorial is the biblical account of Jonathan and David, because it is the quintessential definition of unrelenting brotherhood and loyalty in the face of adversity. In the tale of Jonathan and David, David is forced into isolation and hiding from his own home, as well as the greater society. This was due to the fact that the king wished to end his life out of a desire for complete despotism. Rather than abandon his fleeing friend, Jonathan continued to pursue the relationship between the two men by visiting David in his solitude, offering advice and companionship in the face of the threatening and anxiety-provoked King Saul. By providing David with information on King Saul's murderous plans, Jonathan and David used tactics of solidarity and self-sufficiency in order to outsmart and outrun the king and his followers. In this way, David used retreat, self-reliance, courage, and his friendship with Jonathan to survive in this uncertain social climate.[1]

For men living in Victorian Era America, this ancient tale was all too relatable, as they felt that their camaraderie being pushed into the outskirts of society and into isolation by their own "King Sauls," or in their case, women. On June 15, 1885, Reverend L.V. Price, of the Knights of Pythias fraternal order, reiterated this idea in a speech delivered to a crowd in Fall River, Massachusetts, he spoke on the goals and secrets of the order. Throughout a speech discussing the social nature of men, and man's inability to achieve this fundamental social need for male friendship, Price highlighted the thought shared by fraternity brothers that one must escape from the larger society in order to achieve a friendship like that of Jonathan and David.[2] His statement that, "every lodge is [...] a sacredly guarded home" shows this necessity to form relationships in the greater society, especially in the social sphere of the home.[3] The promise, that "what a Jonathan would do for a David [...] one knight would do for another," was proposed by the Pythian Knights and numerous fraternal orders during the time, to their ever expanding populations. These recruits were men seeking refuge in exclusively male lodges from what they perceived as an increasingly feminized society.[4]

During the mid to late nineteenth-century, American fraternal orders became increasingly popular among white males. Although this period has often been described as the "Golden Age of Fraternity," as it witnessed a large increase in membership, what is still debated is why fraternal orders expe-

rienced popularity and increased membership during the mid to late 1800s. What role did the concern that American society was becoming increasingly feminized play in male attractions to fraternities?[5] How did fraternities attract such men, and what roles did the employment of secretive rituals and gender exclusivity play? These are the questions that this essay tries to answer.

Gaining an understanding of why men were joining fraternal organizations at an increasing rate during the late nineteenth century is important, because it allows for a better understanding of how men viewed themselves in relation to the greater society. For example, how men felt about women and their perceived relation to them can be understood if men were joining fraternities out of the belief that women were feminizing Victorian Era social institutions. What men could gain from the fraternal order is revealed when one understands why men were joining fraternal orders as well as what they were hoping to distance themselves from in the outside world.

The popular belief that society was becoming increasingly feminized, in social institutions such as the church, the home, and the workplace, caused fraternal membership to increase during the mid to late 1800s. To avoid this feminized society, men sought solace in the fraternal order, viewing it as a place where one could reclaim his manhood by retreating from the greater society and developing masculine traits, such as self-reliance. This was achieved through, and can be seen by, the exclusion of women in membership, the use of rituals as a means of promoting self-reliance , the traits of masculinity, and rejection female auxiliaries.

While fraternal orders allowed men to escape the presence of women, this exclusivity and escapism also allowed fraternal members to enforce white supremacy by limiting or rejecting the membership of men of other races. According to Mary Ann Clawson, "racial exclusion was a hallmark of mainstream American fraternalism throughout its history."[6] The validity of this statement is shown in no greater way than by the numerous discriminatory clauses put forth by fraternal orders. Through these clauses, fraternal brethren attempted to promote exclusively white membership. Statements describing the necessary characteristics of fraternity members put forth by the order of the Odd Fellows, that a member must be "a free, white man," and rules stated by the Elks that, "No person shall be accepted as a member of this Order unless he be a white male..." exhibit these exclusionary and discriminatory tactics. Clauses banning Native Americans from membership in the Improved Order of Red Men show this same pattern of discrimination.[7]

Another way that the fraternities perpetuated racism can be seen by the fact that fraternal orders, such as the Freemasons, blatantly rejected the legitimacy of "Negro Lodges." Delmar Darrah, a Mason of high rank, reiterates that black factions needed to be "regarded as spurious and illegitimate."[8] White fraternal members also ostracized lodges, such as the Grand Lodge of Washington in 1898, that

tried to abolish fraternal segregation.[9] When the Grand Lodge of Washington showed support for the authenticity of the Prince Hall Masons, a black fraternal order, at least four "Grand Lodges" refused to associate themselves with the lodge for their alleged traitorous proposition.[10] According to the Masons of white Grand Lodges, these black factions were "clandestine," and not "genuinely" Masonic.[11] The backlash against the Grand Lodge of Washington for supporting racial equality in the fraternal order is not a unique case. For example, when the Modern Woodmen of America attempted to admit a black man to an Illinois order in 1889, it resulted in the creation of an official "whites-only" policy in 1892.[12]

Significantly, the Ancient Order of Foresters of America asserted its independence from the High Court of England after ruling in 1875 that membership be limited to "white males." Because the High Court did not have rules discriminating against race, the court concluded in 1888 that "a Subsidiary High Court for the United States be granted." This meant that American Foresters would have no subjection to English regulations or orders, thus allowing them to adopt any racial policy they pleased.[13]

To acknowledge this racial discrimination is important, and one must not disregard the role that the fraternal order has played in white supremacy groups like the Ku Klux Klan. Many Klan members also held Mason membership, and it was not rare for Klansmen to recruit new members in Masonic lodges.[14] In addition, the creation of the Second Ku Klux Klan as a "membership organization" can be attributed to fraternal agent William J. Simmons in 1915.[15] Because of racial diversity and the increased presence of women in male dominated social spheres, white American men resorted to tactics of retreat and exclusion in the face of an ever changing and ever diversifying society.

This racial exclusion was related to female exclusion in fraternal orders. According to Clawson, "the exclusion of blacks was parallel to the exclusion of women [...] Freemasonry [...] was historically no more available to black men than it was to women of any race."[16] As with racial segregation, and the failure among fraternal brethren to recognize the legitimacy of lodges composed of members other than white men, the female auxiliary was often disregarded as illegitimate as well. For example, the order of the Pythian Sisters was not viewed as a legitimate Pythian organization until twenty-seven years after it had been created.[17] Similarly, when women first began creating "Rebekah Lodges" of their own, the Odd Fellow fraternal order stated that any lodge associated with this female faction, "in whatever form they might be, could not be countenanced or permitted," and were consequently labeled as "irregular and forbidden."[18]

While fraternities certainly allowed men to escape racial diversity and feminized social spheres, one must also consider that members were attracted to fraternal orders because of their ability to achieve upward social mobility. The desire among men to label themselves as self-made men was becom-

ing increasingly popular and anxiety-provoking during the Victorian Era in America. This was due to the rise of industrial capitalism during the nineteenth century, which, according to Clifford Putney, triggered an increased sense of "urbanization and alienation" among men.[19] The fraternal order, and its inclusion of men in differing social classes, was especially attractive for those living in a period that, according to David Montgomery, was characterized by its "prolonged, intense, bitter, and spreading class conflict."[20]

The vast material culture of Victorian Era fraternities, such as the sashes, jewels, metals, badges, and scepters earned to display one's status and social ranking within the order, clearly show the ability for a man to exhibit individual success and high social ranking within the fraternal order.[21] That men could more easily climb the ladder of the fraternal hierarchy than in the wider world, resonated with members. According to Putney, within the fraternal order, "it [was] possible for a carpenter to mount higher and collect more medals than a banker," and any man, no matter what his real occupation, could "ascend to the rank of Grand High Illuminator."[22]

The desire to achieve upward social mobility and the consequent appeal of the fraternity for men can also be viewed in terms of gender. For example, the fluid structure of the fraternity allowed men to overcome their fears of failure and being labeled as effeminate in the rigid marketplace. In contrast, the fraternity allowed men to experience homosocial camaraderie in such a way that promoted Victorian traits of masculinity as self-success. In this sense, fraternal orders developed their own societies in which men could rely on one another and still experience individual success, having the opportunity to label oneself as self-reliant as well as a self-made man, thus enforcing a greater sense of masculinity.[23]

Along with the incentive of achieving a higher social status in the fluid hierarchical structure of the fraternity, the availability of monetary support from the orders in times of adversity also attracted American men to 19th century fraternal orders. The idea of "mutual relief" was included with the membership of many post-Civil War fraternal orders. For example, the Knights of Pythias claimed that the needs of "sickness," "accident," "loss of employment," and other "troubles [...] which may distress and drive him [members] to despair" were to be taken care of and met "promptly" by the "full extent of [...] the united capabilities of the brotherhood."[24] This idea of "mutual relief," which acted as an incentive for men of the Victorian Era in joining fraternal orders, is significant because it eventually took a more definitive and monetary shape through the availability of cheap life insurance. Fraternal mutual aid has most commonly persisted in fraternal orders, or "benefit societies," such as Lions International, Kiwanis International, and Rotary International.[25]

Along with the ability for men to climb the fraternal social hierarchy and seclude themselves from individuals of other races, the availability of life insurance was also a promoter of Victorian Era masculinity in the face of a feminized society. The ability for men to pay for life insurance through fraternal fees helped turn an act that had once been viewed as "charity" for those who were poor and dependent on others into a "purchasable commodity" fit for even the most self-reliant and masculine of men.[26] For example, in the context of the fraternity, this "mutual aid" was no longer viewed as an emasculating act of dependency or charity. Instead, it became yet another way for a man to showcase his ability to act as the sole provider and protector of his family by monetarily investing in their futures. The idea that mutual aid enforced self-reliance and men's ability to act as the heads of their households was also used as the dominant argument against women who wished to join fraternal orders. Women were told that the fraternal order was set in place to protect and provide for them, not to corrupt them with the secrets and dangers of the orders.[27]

While fraternal orders in the United States have persisted from the 1700s to the present day, according to an 1897 report by W.S. Harwood in the North American Review, the fraternity experienced its "Golden Age" and height of membership during the closing years of the nineteenth century.[28] During the mid to late 1800s, fraternal membership among adult men reached over five million in a national population of nineteen million men. This caused Harwood to report that "every fifth, or possibly every eighth, man you meet is identified with some fraternal organization."[29]

According to Clawson, fraternities of the Victorian Era saw "expansion and vitality" as the Civil War served as a "watershed" in the growth of 19th century orders.[30] For example, most of the larger and more significant fraternal orders, along with hundreds of others, came into creation during this period. This included orders such as the Knights of Pythias in 1864, the Benevolent and Protective Order of the Elks in 1866, the Ancient Order of the United Workmen in 1868, the Ancient Arabic Order of the Mystic Shrine in 1871, the Knights of Honor in 1873, the Royal Arcanum in 1877, the Knights of the Maccabees in 1878, and the Modern Woodmen of America in 1883.[31] Although it has been identified that men were joining fraternities in Victorian America, the question as to why this was occurring is yet to be answered.

This era created attractions for masculinity, including the traits of "escapism" and "self-reliance," which have persisted as characteristics of American masculinity. During the mid-19th century, men faced increasing economic competition and the anxiety of having to constantly "prove" their manhood. According to Michael Kimmel, the Victorian Era in America brought fears among men, as well as challenges to their masculinities, because "men's economic, political, and social identity was no longer fixed," and instead had to be openly demonstrated. This was anxiety-provoking, because men

were living in a capitalistic era where there was no limit on a man's potential success or failure. The fact that the marketplace, according to Henry David Thoreau, could be more accurately labeled as the "site of humiliation" showed this sense of anxiety resulting from the perception that one had to "prove" his masculinity. The migration of thousands of men to the American West as frontiersmen during the Gold Rush of 1849, hoping to start life anew as self-made men and reclaim their manhood, also illustrates this desire in men to escape in the face of a changing social, political, and economic landscape.[32]

To escape this new social climate of possible humiliation, or dependency on others, many men resorted to methods of retreat and exclusion. Exclusion also served to emancipate themselves from the constraints of domesticity and those social spheres associated with women and femininity, which posed a threat to fragile masculinities.[33] In the face of perceived competition and feminization, the white Victorian man protected his areas of escape by excluding those who posed a threat, such as women and those of other races.[34] The fraternity can be viewed as a form of escapism because men used the fraternal lodge as a means of escaping the presence of women and were able to find solace in the homosocial and homo-racial environment. For the 19th century American man, the fraternity served as a "sanctuary" outside of the social institutions of the larger society. For example, men could retreat to the lodge to experience a sense of homosocial support that acted in conjunction with the masculine trait of self-reliance that they so desperately desired.[35]

To enfore isolation, the Masons feared exposés about the secrets and rituals of fraternities. If Masonic secrets were exposed, the outside world would gain knowledge of lodge activities, thus corrupting the secrecy of the order and its ability to stand as an institution unique from the greater society. In one such instance in 1826, Masons allegedly drowned an ex-mason named William Morgan in Lake Ontario, for publishing *Illustrations of Masonry*, an Anti-Masonic exposé. While this incident was fervently refuted by Masons, it brought forth an Anti-Masonic period that set out to slander the fraternal order and infiltrate its secrets.[36] Among these "Anti-Masons" were women.[37]

Fraternal orders such as the Knights of Pythias, which aimed to create spaces where "the wealth and pleasure of the outside world" could not compete with the "pure gold of brotherly love" show the use of the fraternal order as a means of escaping the pressures of the greater feminized society.[38] According to A. B. Grosh, the highest ranking member of the Odd Fellows, male bonding in the fraternity allowed men to "[band] together to stimulate their better affections" and achieve "the innate principles of man's nature."[39] Grosh's statement that "our lodge is our family," also shows the idea that the fraternity could act as the new masculine domestic sphere for men.[40] Thus, escapism, as a trait of masculinity, reached a peak during the Victorian Era in America and established the patterns of isolationist characteristic displayed in these fraternal orders and lodges.

Enforcing the masculine trait of self-reliance is also a common theme among Victorian Era fraternal orders. George P. Morris joined the Odd Fellow fraternal order because he comprehended the "value and influence" of the order and its ability "to inculcate a greater respect for their [member's] personal character, and educate them in the principles of self-reliance." More radically, Morris even went on to state that he hoped to "abolish" all the "convivial" features of fraternal life to further inculcate and enforce masculine traits like self-reliance and moral character.[41]

Such fraternal orders also served to protect male privilege and protect gender superiority over women as men excluded women from "participation in games and sporting events..., party politics and electioneering..., and public drinking," because these were "extra-familial" activities that men had designated as their own, restricting all others.[42] By granting themselves a greater sense of control through the restriction of women in these social sectors, men viewed those spheres affiliated with the home, family, and religion, in which women could partake, as increasingly feminized. The feminization of these social spheres consequently called for retreat, thus reinforcing the relevance of the fraternal order. The exclusion of women from such orders was justified as the need for camaraderie and the traits of masculinity to develop between men. Restrictive policies on gender, like those put forth by the Odd Fellows, which banned "all women" show a clear disdain for women and view women as a threat to the superiority and manhood of white men.[43]

As women began to increase their presence in the greater society, men felt that extra-familial social sectors that they had designated for themselves were "under attack." For example, women began asserting themselves in the larger society in educational spheres and reformist clubs and groups like the Women's Christian Temperance Union. Even more threatening to these men were suffragists demanding equal participation in the political sphere. Even within the household, the "cult of domesticity" seemed to grant women too great an authority in the eyes of men.[44]

As men viewed the home as a feminized institution, the fraternal order gained increasing popularity, excluded women and encouraged strictly masculine self-sufficiency, solidarity, and hegemony.[45] With the idea that women had feminized the household, being its most popular inhabitants, men felt unable to spend time or socialize within the home. According to Mark C. Carnes, the fraternity acted as a new "family environment" where men were able to display paternal roles in an easier way, unlike in the outside society. Men saw the larger society as feminized and as a threat to the masculinities that they were anxiously attempting to both protect and project during an era that called for escape.[46]

For men in nineteenth-century America, the lodges of fraternal orders were also increasingly sought out because they acted as a new and "manlier" version of the Protestant church. During this era, femininity came to represent virtue and com-

passion to the greater society. Men viewed women as upholders and enforcers of morality.[47] According to Clawson, because men saw women as "custodians of social morality," fraternal lodges consequently labeled themselves as "purveyors of moral education."[48] One of the most important attitudes to exude to the larger population was that fraternal brethren were not spiritually or morally dependent on women, but were self-reliant and able to thrive without the help of women.

Fraternities banned women from membership to ardently refute the idea that men were to rely on women in terms of spirituality.[49] The fraternal order offered men doctrines of "Muscular Christianity," rather than the weak and effeminate depictions of Jesus Christ that were being offered by churches of the Victorian Era and by their ministers. One such minister even stated that, when a "great burly man" finally came to Christ, he became "patient as a lamb" and as "gentle as the mother."[50] For these men, hearing characteristics believed to represent femininity, such as kindness, compassion, and gentleness being given to Christ was enough for them to desire a more masculine and muscular version of Christianity. In Muscular Christianity, Jesus was a carpenter rather than a peacemaker.[51] Members of fraternal orders even expressed the idea that "lodges encouraged 'manly' worship, while churches belonged to women and 'unmasculine' men," in reference to the clergy.[52] For these men, relying on the Protestant church now served as the equivalent to relying on women.[53] For example, when discussing women and Freemasonry, Robert Morris, a writer and poet of Masonic propaganda, stated "the key to the lodge room is eternally denied to her... Her soft voice may arouse passionate emotions within us as she pleads for aid outside the door... Her sphere is in the heavens, ours within the lodge, and though her light and warmth may reach us, her form cannot enter."[54] He even stated "Why is not Masonry open to the female sex? Because females are not men."[55]

Therefore, fraternal orders tended to focus more on the Old Testament of the Bible. This allowed men to develop their own masculine and distant image of God rather than accept the seemingly weak and effeminate Jesus Christ that women and the mainstream Protestant church had appropriated. When fraternal members carried out rituals and theatrical performances of Old Testament patriarchsthey made Sunday morning church servicemore masculine than the conventional one.[56]

Fraternal orders' rituals show their fear of feminization. Rituals allowed men to showcase their masculinity through traits of self-reliance and courage. It often comprised situations in which men were subjected to fear and vulnerability. In this sense, rituals served as a means of proving one's manhood through symbolic rites of passage. Much of the ritual, symbolism, and material culture that existed within the Victorian Era fraternal order gained significance among members in the same way as any other social construct.[57] According to Clawson, the "power of a cultural product may depend precisely on its ability to engage people at different levels of meaning." In this sense, Clawson explains how fraternal culture, such as the ritual, united members. Because men placed significant

meaning on the practices, initiations, and sacred objects in fraternal orders, they became a means of proving one's masculinity.[58] This was attractive for Victorian Era men, because feminized society did not offer such opportunities.

Initiation rituals for men in fraternal orders often included blindfolding and other methods used to invoke a sense of "terror or humiliation" in initiates. An initiate had to demonstrate himself as strong, self-reliant, and deserving of the membership and camaraderie offered by the order.[59] For example, in the an initiation ritual of the Knights of Pythias, fraternal members commanded initiates to leap upon a score of tempered spikes... and when they pierce[d] his naked, tender feet," the conductors of the ceremony "prime[d] [their] ears to catch the groaning of each new born pain." In this way, initiates showed courage. "If his lips parted by a moan," the Knights found such "not fit to sit within Hall."[60] He had to prove he was not a member "of gentler sex."[61]

Beyond initiation, members also participated in multiple symbolic rites in order to ascend the ladder of the fraternal hierarchy. For example, in the lodges of the Masons, to enter each of the "three degrees" of Masonry, which were the "Entered Apprentice, Fellowcraft, and Master Mason," members had to complete specific initiation rituals for each "degree" of membership. Similarly, in the order of the Odd Fellows, rituals were completed as one sought to gain membership in the highest of the four "degrees," which were "White, Pink, Blue, and Scarlet." This further fed a greater sense of masculinity, as it allowed men to declare themselves as self-made and self-reliant as they climbed the hierarchical social ladder.[62]

Fraternal rituals contrast sharply with the nature of rituals of female auxiliaries that developed later. Where men tended to be disoriented, blindfolded and placed in situations meant to invoke fear upon initiation to "overcome his fears... in order to be transformed and incorporated into the fraternal union,"[63] female factions of these fraternal lodges did not seek to test their initiates, or grant them membership into any sort of social hierarchy. For example, women did not need to show courage or overcome any sort of challenging situation in the rituals required by auxiliaries like the Order of the Easter Star and the Daughters of Rebekah. Rather than show self-reliance, women were instead viewed as individuals who had to rely on the help and compassion of others to be initiated and accepted as a member of the fraternal order.[64]

The rituals that men created for women included scenes in which initiates would pretend to place a lock over their mouths, to prevent themselves from revealing any Masonic secrets. Men viewed women as being too irresponsible to withhold their "feminine" desires to reveal secrets. They destroy the

ability for the fraternal order to serve as a place of retreat and seclusion from the outside society. At the same time, men promoted themselves as being able to hold their tongues and think rationally while keeping secrets.[65] Mason Robert Morris described women as an "open-mouthed class of feminine Antimasons."[66]

Furthermore, while men performed numerous rituals during their fraternal membership and elevation, women were only initiated once. This is because men did not perceive women as having the ability to ascend a social hierarchy. Victorian era men held that women were "taken into the organization by virtue of [their] helpless state, a state that is natural to [their] sex," not because they were self-reliant.[67]

The fear of feminization among men, and the use of the fraternal order as a means of escaping a supposedly feminized society, as obvious in the reactions of male fraternity members when faced with the prospect of allowing women to join fraternal orders. Prior to the existence of female auxiliaries, the desire among women to join fraternal orders began to increase as Anti-Masonic attitudes became more popular in the outside society. Following the drowning of ex-Mason William Morgan in 1826, anti-Mason sentiment spread widely and forced many orders to review their exclusions. Among the leading anti-Masons were women, who wished to breach the gender restrictions of fraternal membership. Anti-Masonry became a threat for Victorian Era men engaged in fraternal life, such that, by 1830, over 130 Anti-Masonic newspapers existed, as well as the official political "Anti-Masonic Party," with its own presidential candidate, William Wirt Jackson, in the election of 1832.[68]

Among the Masons fraught with anxiety over preserving the image of fraternalism and the seclusion of their orders was Pope Catlin Huntington. In 1886, Huntington published *The True History Regarding Alleged Connection of the Order of Ancient, Free and Accepted Masons With the Abduction and Murder of William Morgan, in Western New York in 1826, Together With Much Interesting and Valuable Contemporary History Compiled From Authentic Documents and Records*. Huntington made the case that Masons were the victims of Anti-Masons who were "pervert[ing] history" by associating Masons with the death of Morgan and stigmatizing them with the title of "hated masons."[69] The debate over the secrecy of masonry challenged the very core of the fraternal order and invited it to defend itself in the wider public. Huntington was merely one of the many proponents to come up with justifications for the exclusionary nature of the fraternity.

One way that men began to defend themselves from Anti-Masonry and justify the exclusion of women in fraternal orders was by stating that the fraternity was, and had been, a social institution that supported women. They argued that women were able to receive financial aid when a husband had died, through the promise of mutual aid ensured through his member

ship in the order. Women were therefore the beneficiaries of their exclusion. This negative reaction by the fraternal order to the prospect of granting women membership shows the fear for women held by members, as well as the function of the fraternity as a means of escaping said women.[70]

Masonic propagandist, Robert Morris slandered women who sought membership by labeling them as unfeminine. Morris argued that men need not worry because "...in general, it is only those viragos who yearn for a beard, and who unsex themselves in their conventions for Woman's Rights, it is only these in general who make the demand."[71] Because these women argued that they were not dependent on men, Morris argued that they were not real women, thus reinforcing men's own sense of masculinity. Morris serves as an example of the thought that in order for a man to achieve a greater sense of masculinity, women had to be reduced to mere dependents on men. In this sense, men stated that the fraternal order was not fit for women due to their dependency and inability to express the masculine traits being demanded. Yet when women proved they were also self-reliant, they were branded unfeminine.

The men of fraternal orders also began to argue that women's exclusion from the fraternity was done out of "protection." Morris even penned a cautionary tale in which a woman refuses to marry a Mason until he shares the secrets of the order with her. By the end of the tale, the woman is left marrying a man who is not a Mason but has even more terrible secrets than the previous, leaving her life in ruins.[72] Morris leaves her as "A childless mother, unable to sleep from sadness" living in "a hell upon earth."[73] It is through this tale that Morris articulated the argument among fraternal members that, if women did not accept the fact that they could not learn all of the secrets of the order, and tried to infiltrate the lodge, they would not be able to reap the rewards or support that fraternalism supposedly offered them.[74] Morris pressed the idea that women were not to gain entrance into the fraternity, but were instead to be reliant on it. In this way, Morris promoted a sense of self-reliance and masculinity in men. This is shown in his statement towards women that, "For you [women] shall the golden harvest of Masonry be gathered, although we may not demand your presence in the tiresome sowing or in the hot reaping."[75]

However, this did not subside the growing threat of infiltration by women and the possibility that the fraternal order could no longer function as a means of escape. In order to combat this threat and the spread of anti-fraternal sentiment, the men of fraternal orders, such as those in the Odd Fellows, the Masons, and the Knights of Pythias, began proposing "honorary degrees" of fraternal orders for women. Among these degrees were the Daughters of Rebekah, the Eastern Star, and the Pythian Sisters.[76] While women could be initiated into these orders, during this period, the "honorary degrees" had yet to achieve sororal autonomy. It was impossible for these female factions to exist without

the membership of men, seeing as fraternal brethren made it mandatory for certain positions of ultimate authority to be held by men.[77] In this sense, men reinforced their sense of self-reliance and masculinity by forcing female fraternal members to depend on them, while still averting negative Anti-Mason press.

While the fraternal order experienced its "Golden Age" during the Victorian Era in America, fraternal participation began to decline beginning in the twentieth century. This decrease in fraternal participation can be viewed in relation to breaches in sacred fraternal secrets and ritual. For example, as in the case of the Second Ku Klux Klan, many fraternal orders during the aughts of the 1900s began to place an increased value on the ability of the fraternity to serve as an organization in which members could tangibly benefit. During the twentieth century, fraternal members were increasingly recruited to join orders by the sales pitches of "fraternal agents." These agents were men who were hired by fraternities to increase their dwindling populations. These fraternal agents sought profit rather than fraternal solidarity seeing as they gained a commission for the number of men they recruited.[78]

As sales agents hoped to turn profits, recruiting more and more men to join fraternal orders, fraternities began to lose their sense of renown and consequently experienced lower levels of attendance and actual participation by their members. The recruited fraternity brethren sought, instead of an escape from a feminized society, the ability to market themselves and gain a larger social network, leaving the fraternal order as a mere entrepreneurial organization.[79] Fraternal orders also began to lose members, due to the fact that, as membership increased among men hoping to acquire economic connections and entrepreneurial opportunity, the rate of payment for membership fees among these men decreased. For example, in 1909, the Knights of Pythias fraternal order lost 48,043 of its 51,673 members who had been initiated that year, seeing as they failed to pay membership fees.[80] These temporary members showed little concern about maintaining the sacredness or functioning of the order.

Organizations hoping to promote the fraternal order as a sacred sphere in which men could symbolically escape from the larger, feminized society did not support this shift in fraternal life. For example, the fraternal order of the Odd Fellows stated "lodges are dominated today by 'Knights for revenue only,' and that the aspect of any type of "benefit" should be abolished from the fraternal order. The Odd Fellows proposed that these regulations would dispel profit-seeking participants and aid in reinforcing the Victorian Era vision of fraternal life.[81] As fraternal orders of the twentieth century became "secularized," as stated by Putney, they lost the expansive membership seen during the Golden Age. Fraternal orders lost their secrecy and ability to serve as areas of retreat and enforcers of masculinity.[82] As stated by Putney, during the twentieth century, "commercialism tarnished fraternalism's pretensions to otherworldliness."[83]

The ability of the fraternal order to function as a means of escape during the Victorian Era was what gave it its ability to attract men to membership at a deeper level than monetary and entrepreneurial incentives did during the twentieth century. For example, the value of maintaining the secrecy of fraternal affairs is shown in an account penned by M.W. Sackett, a leader of the Ancient Order of United Workmen. In his account, the head of The Committee on Ritual was caught plagiarizing a Mason ritual. When accusations came to light, an initiate undertaking the plagiarized ritual stated, "What kind of situation is this! Thieves! Thieves!!... I want nothing to do with people who appropriate what does not belong to them."[84] In this sense, understanding that the fraternal order declined as it became a less sacred and less secretly guarded social institution is significant, seeing as it enforces the idea that the fraternal order increased in popularity because it was seen as a more sacred and more secretly guarded social institution during the Victorian Era.

As the fraternal order upheld secrecy and isolation, it allowed men to escape from a larger, feminized society, thus resulting in an expansive increase in membership. This was achieved through the exclusion of women in membership, the use of rituals as a means of promoting self-reliance and traits of masculinity, and the rejection of later developed female auxiliaries. During the Victorian Era, the fraternal order experienced increased popularity, membership, and participation, seeing as it allowed men to partake in the masculine trait of retreat. Through the use of rituals and the denial of the legitimacy of female auxiliaries, these men promoted the masculine trait of self-reliance. By forcing other members of Victorian Era American society into the role of mere dependents on men, as seen in the case of women's auxiliaries and "Negro Lodges," Victorian Era men granted themselves a greater sense of masculinity. Within these fraternal orders, men were able to showcase traits of masculinity, which they did not deem as an easy feat in the greater, feminized society. The ability for men to easily ascend the ladder of the fraternal hierarchy and to invest in the futures of their familial dependents through the purchase of fraternal life insurance, also aided in promoting masculinity within the fraternal order, unlike in the greater, feminized, and capitalistic society.

By reducing the fraternal order to a secular, benefit-based organization in the twentieth century, it lost its appeal among men, seeing as it was no longer an institution by which men could escape an increasingly feminized society, as was the case in the Victorian Era. In these secularized fraternal orders of the twentieth century, men experienced a greater sense of anonymity. In this way, fraternal brethren no longer viewed themselves as having the same

sacred and unrelenting brotherhood they once likened to that of the biblical friendship of Jonathan and David. As the fraternal order no longer served as an escape for men from their own "King Sauls," the fraternity fell from its "Golden Age." In this sense, the fraternal order met its demise when it was unable to shield men from the greater, feminized society, seeing as it could no longer aid in the reinforcement of masculine traits of retreat, self-reliance, and male solidarity in the face of an ever changing and ever diversifying society.

Sarah Patarini

Class of 2019

Endnotes

1. Sam. 18–24 (English Standard Version).
2. James R. Carnahan, *Pythian Knighthood, Its History and Literature* (Cincinnati: The Pettibone Manufacturing Company, 1888), 527.
3. Ibid., 528.
4. Ibid., 531.
5. W. S. Harwood, "Secret Societies in America," *The North American Review* 164, no. 486 (1897): 23.
6. Mary Ann Clawson, *Constructing Brotherhood: Class, Gender, and Fraternalism* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989), 131.
7. Alvin J. Schmidt and Nicholas Babchuck, "The Unbrotherly Brotherhood: Discrimination in Fraternal Orders," *Phylon* 34 no. 3 (1973): 278; Clifford Putney, "Service Over Secrecy: How Lodge-Style Fraternalism Yielded Popularity to Men's Service Clubs," *Journal of Popular Culture* 27 no. 1 (1993): 181.
8. Schmidt and Babchuck, "Unbrotherly Brotherhood," 277.
9. Ibid., 278.
10. Clawson, *Constructing Brotherhood*, 134.
11. Ibid., 134.
12. Ibid., 134.
13. Albert Clark Stevens, *The Cyclopædia of Fraternities; a Compilation of Existing Authentic Information and the Results of Original Investigation as to More Than Six Hundred Secret Societies in the United States* (New York City: Hamilton Printing and Publishing Company, 1899), 228–229.
14. Schmidt and Babchuck, "Unbrotherly Brotherhood," 280.
15. Clawson, *Constructing Brotherhood*, 130.
16. Ibid., 135.
17. Ibid., 200.
18. Theodore A. Ross, *Odd Fellowship: Its History and Manual* (New York: The M.W. Hazen Co., 1887), 188.
19. Putney, "Service Over Secrecy," 182.
20. David Montgomery, "Labor and the Republic in Industrial America: 1860–1920," *Le Mouvement Social*, no. 111 (April–June, 1980), 204; Clawson, *Constructing Brotherhood*, 7.
21. Putney, "Service Over Secrecy," 180; Henderson-Ames Co, *Paraphanalia and Supplies for Subordinate Lodges of the Knights of Pythias, in Strict Accordance with Ritualistic Requirements* (Kalamzoo: Henderson-Ames Co., 1894), 1–224.
22. Ibid., 181–182.
23. Clawson, *Constructing Brotherhood*, 14.
24. Carnahan, *Pythian Knighthood*, 529.
25. Putney, "Service Over Secrecy," 179–185.
26. Clawson, *Constructing Brotherhood*, 222.
27. Ibid.,188–189.
28. Harwood, "Secret Societies," 623.
29. Ibid., 617.
30. Clawson, *Constructing Brotherhood*, 123.
31. Ibid.,124.
32. Michael Kimmel, *Manhood in America: a Cultural History* (New York: Oxford University

Press, 2012), 32.
33. Ibid., 32.
34. Ibid., 33.
35. Ibid., 126.
36. Clawson, *Constructing Brotherhood*,115–116.
37. Ibid., 186.
38. Carnahan, *Pythian Knighthood*, 515.
39. Aaron B. Grosh, *The Odd-Fellow's Improved Manual: Containing the History, Defence, Principles, and Government of the Order; the Instructions of Each Degree, and Duties of Every Station and Office in Odd-Fellowship; with Directions and Forms for Laying Corner-Stones, Dedicating Cemeteries, Halls, Etc., Marshalling Processions, Etc.; also, Odes, with Music, for Various Occasions, and the Most Needed Business Forms. Embellished with a Portrait of Grand Secretary Jas. L. Ridgely, and Engravings of the Emblems, Etc.* (Philadelphia: T. Bliss & Co., 1871), 175.
40. Grosh, *The Odd-Fellow's Improved Manual*, 206.
41. Henry Leonard Stillson, *The Official History and Literature of Odd Fellowship the Three-link Fraternity* (Boston: The Fraternity Publishing Company, 1898), 223.
42. Clawson, *Constructing Brotherhood*, 178.
43. Putney, "Service Over Secrecy," 181.
44. Clawson, *Constructing Brotherhood*, 179.
45. Ibid., 179.
46. Carnes, *Secret Ritual*, 116–127.
47. Clawson, *Constructing Brotherhood*, 185.
48. Ibid., 186.
49. Clawson, *Constructing Brotherhood*, 17.
50. Kimmel, *Manhood in America*, 129.
51. Ibid., 129.; Putney, "Service Over Secrecy," 183.
52. Putney, "Service Over Secrecy," 183.
53. Carnes, *Secret Ritual*, 77.
54. Robert Morris, *Lights and Shadows of Freemasonry* (Louisville: J.F. Brennan, 1852), 94–95.
55. Ibid., 123.
56. Carnes, *Secret Ritual*, 14.
57. Clawson, *Constructing Brotherhood*, 11.
58. Ibid., 12.
59. Ibid., 180.
60. Ezra Asher Cook, *Knights of Pythias Illustrated* (Chicago: E.A. Cook & Co., 1878), 70.
61. Ibid., 71.
62. Clawson, *Constructing Brotherhood*, 181.
63. Ibid., 197.
64. Ibid., 197.
65. Ibid., 183–184.
66. Morris, *Lights and Shadows*, 123.
67. Clawson, *Constructing Brotherhood*, 198.
68. Ibid., 116.
69. Pope Catlin Huntington, *The True History Regarding Alleged Connection of the Order of Ancient, Free and Accepted Masons With the Abduction and Murder of William Morgan, in Western New*

York in 1826, Together With Much Interesting and Valuable Contemporary History Compiled From Authentic Documents and Records (New York: M.W. Hazen Co., 1886), 12–15.

70. Clawson, *Constructing Brotherhood*, 188–189.
71. Morris, *Lights and Shadows of Freemasonry*, 123.
72. Ibid., 115–122.
73. Ibid., 121.
74. Clawson, *Constructing Brotherhood*, 190.
75. Morris, *Lights and Shadows*, 124.
76. Clawson, *Constructing Brotherhood*, 187.
77. Ibid., 195.
78. Ibid., 17.
79. Ibid., 17.
80. Ibid., 241.
81. Ibid., 242.
82. Putney, "Service Over Secrecy," 179.
83. Ibid., 184.
84. Myron Ward Sackett, *Early History of Fraternal Beneficiary Societies in America* (Meadville, Pa: The Tribune Publishing Company, 1914), 108.

Michael Scirè

Jadids, Muslim-Marxism, and the Soviet State: 1880s–1930s

The frustrations that the Jadids faced in their program for cultural reform from their founding in the late 19th Century onward resulted in their increasing radicalization. Jadidism developed from a largely rhetorical movement into an increasingly radical one. Nationalism, then support for socialism, marked the Jadids' developing approach to cultural reform. While this development was partially generated by political realities of the varying regimes in power of the Russian state, it was a shift born out of competition with the local elites and the Jadids' disconnect with—and contempt for—traditional Muslim society in Central Asia.

Generally, Jadids entertained Marxism out of convenience—with some notable exceptions. The October Revolution of 1917 offered an opportunity to outmaneuver the established local elites, and the Bolshevik manifestation of Marxism was emphasized in the anti-imperialist policy of Lenin's writings, were very appealing for Jadids.[1] Most came to mix socialism and nationalism, which would inevitably lead to conflict with the Soviet state. The Jadids were accepting of the Bolshevik regime's policies and actions after 1917, because it allowed them to carry out reforms, which until then had been a frustrated objective. The Jadids' dealings with the emergent Soviet state from 1917 onward are reflective of the ideological relationship that Jadids developed between Marxism, nationalism, and cultural reform prior to and during the events of 1917. The Jadids' relationship with the Soviet state was marked by a period of alliance and mutual benefit. These soon turned to suspicion and purges.

One notable Jadid, Mir-Said Sultan-Galiev (1892–1940), entertained Marxism prior to the Bolshevik's successes, and as a result, enjoyed great success in the early Soviet state. His unique synthesis of Marxism and Islamic principles, in accordance with the objectives of Jadids, offers an example of the compatibility between Islamic principles, Marxism, and the reform minded Jadids. His espoused policies sought to address the disconnect between the Soviet state's revolutionary policy in the East, the reform efforts of the Jadids, and the currents developing within the Central Asian Muslim society generally. Sultan-Galiev stands in contrast to the Soviet state's attitude of "Great-Russian Chauvinism," and most Jadids' contempt and disconnect with their own traditional Muslim societies.[2] He was a "chief mediator between, on the one hand, an increasingly autocratic Soviet socialist elite…and the reform-minded Muslim Eurasians, on the other."[3] It is in Sultan-Galiev that Jadidism and Marxism reached a unique synthesis that can be noted as Muslim-Marxism.

Jadidism is most often noted as having been founded by Ismail Bey Gaspirali (1851–1914), and was a synthesis of European-style modernization, ideas of nationalism, and what it meant to be a "modern" nation, all of which was paired with Islamic principles. It is through Gaspirali, that Sultan-Galiev was introduced to the Jadid movement.[4] The idea of modernizing Muslim societies was a widespread phenomena during the late 19th century, and can especially be noted in the Ottoman Empire.[5] However, the creation of Jadidism was specific to the realities of modernizing objectives and the presence of Russian imperial expansion into Central Asia during the 1860s and 1880s.

Although Jadidism varied in its manifestations to great degrees, often dependent on the realities and sentiments of the societies and people who sought reform, it can be said that all Jadids shared thedesire to reform education, reorganize their societies which they lived in, and lift Muslims to a status comparable to their European compatriots.[6] It is important to note here that Jadids across Central Asia saw Muslims as a nation unified in the common practice of Islam rather than the ethno-linguistic manifestation of the "nation" familiarized by European nationalist history.

Leading to the the First World War, Jadids sought reform within their societies by operating within the boundaries set in place by the Russian Tsarist state. The living conditions for most Muslims in Central Asia were relatively poor, owning to the relegated status of Central Asia as a colonial territory within the Tsarist Russian state. Jadids supported the war effort, and had little sympathy towards those Muslims who participated in the anti-draft Basmachi Uprisings (1916–1934).[7] This sentiment contrasted with those of the general Muslim populations, who considered themselves a colonized people by the Russian state, and therefore rose against calls for forced conscription in 1916. These uprisings were generally supported by the established local elites, Ulema, or traditional Islamic religious scholars. Jadids and the Ulema were in constant conflict for cultural capital with the Jadids seeing the Ulema as an obstacle to overcome for radical reform, and similarly, the Ulema saw the Jadids as a threat to their established position of prominence within society. This tension shaped their relationship with one another. As such, despite their agreement on definitions of their communities by territorial and cultural characteristics, the Ulema sought to preserve traditional practices, while the Jadids' reformist tendency "led to a desacralized view of the world in which ever larger domains were to be freed from religious dogma and in which the well-being and progress of Muslims as a community took precedence over Islam as a faith."[8] This outlook set the Jadids directly in conflict with the Ulema, who derived their influence within Central Asian society from it's conservative religious roots.

It was not until the February Revolution in 1917 that the Jadids across Central Asia managed to develop a significant popularity within their various societies. Prior to this, the Ulema had enjoyed near complete hegemony over the

cultural capital of the Muslim population, and the Jadids' efforts to reform their societies were largely frustrated as a result of this hegemony as well as the poor reception of their ideas from a traditional agrarian society.[9] Before the establishment of the Provisional Government, Jadids attempted to argue their case through literature, oral argument, and general persuasion to no avail. The February Revolution opened new opportunities for the Jadids, and they "flocked into the new organs of power and threw their energies into a number of projects of cultural transformation."[10] Jadids established theaters, schools, literary groups, and other organizations to promote local culture and agency.

As a result of this new enthusiasm and participation in government, a group consisting largely of Jadids formed the first All-Russian Muslim Congress in May, 1917. This congress proclaimed to represent the desires of the Muslim territories, they advocated for the establishment of a democratic republic of Russia, where territories would have autonomy within a federated Russian state. They also advocated for separate Muslim military units,which would be organized on a volunteer basis. This would have been a notable addition, because the Basmachi Uprising was occurring in Central Asia, although it had been isolated. Just as well, Jadids suggested that cultural and educational matters should be controlled by the governments of the territories.[11]

When the Bolsheviks seized power in the October Revolution of 1917 and civil war broke out shortly after, the Jadids hurried to force the implementation of these statutes with the establishments of Kokand Autonomy, which was hoped to be the inklings of an autonomous and independent Turkistan, beginning in Tashkent. The attempt to establish this autonomous nation within Russia was a deviation from the Jadids' previous policy of purely social and cultural reform. This can be viewed as a change from reform-minded initiative to a position of revolutionary nationalism. The Jadids' frustrations had finally been alleviated by their participation in the Provisional Government, and with its dissolution, many felt that an independent nation for Russia's Muslims was the only hope for reform. With the formation of Kokand, the Jadids completely excluded the Ulema, and suffered from little support as a result.[12] The Bolsheviks crushed the Kokand autonomy movement in 1918; however, they seemingly did not hold a grudge against the Jadids for their separatism. Only one notable Jadid was sent into exile as a result of the affair, but he, Mustafa Choqay (1890–1941), continued to pursue the idea of an independent Turkistan from abroad.[13] He went on to write about the failings of Kokand autonomy, citing that the lack of professional "human resources," and opposition of the Ulema were fundamental to its failure.[14]

After Kokand, most Jadids allied themselves with the new Soviet state. The Bolsheviks were seeking a similar cultural revolution to that of the Jadids, in the form of: education reform, upheaval of hierarchical order of society, and aggressive modernization policies.[15] "With considerable support from Moscow, local Jadids penetrated the Communist Party of Turkestan...

through a network of 'Muslim' bureaus of the party and special 'Muslim' cells of the Turkestan Commissariat of Nationalities, effectively making the regime their own."[16] Although the Jadids could not advance their political and cultural agenda on their own terms, they continued to utilize all avenues for reform, and that largely manifested itself within the Communist Party.

The Ulema were relegated to less prominent positions within society, and their authority became secondary to that of the Jadids, thus effectively ending the forty-year conflict for cultural capital among Central Asian elites. The Bolsheviks' anti-religious policies (although they were lenient towards Islam, in hopes of fostering good relations with their Muslim border regions and neighboring nations) served the Jadids, at least immediately, to do away with the Ulema.[17]

Sultan-Galiev arguably benefitted more than most Jadids from the Bolshevik takeover, as he rose through the ranks of the Communist Party partly because he had supported the Bolshevik cause before the October 1917 revolution. Sultan-Galiev proposed strategies on how to justify a non-religioun based state-organ to be established among the deeply religious Muslims in the border regions. He urged caution in this objective, with an easing period that included introducing atheists into local communities.[18] He, like the other Jadids, sought to deemphasize the role that the Ulema played in Central Asian society, and Soviet secular modernization policy served that end.

However, the Jadids' successes were not without a price. The Soviet regime had its own goals that it expected the Jadids' would help to establish. The Bolsheviks had little real influence in the Muslim border regions, and they utilized the Jadids to establish effective government there. The Jadids' desire to dethrone the Ulema in Central Asian society served the Bolsheviks to overthrow any future opposition. Just as well, the Soviet state spent a great deal on political reeducation, because the population had to be mobilized and needed to be "taught new ways of thinking about politics." The Bolshevik government developed a network of Red Teahouses, Red Yurts, and Red Corners as a way of incorporating Central Asia into the developing Soviet state.[19] Although many Jadids were receptive of socialism after the events of 1918, they usually mixed socialism with Muslim nationalism, and this was more than enough reason for the Soviet state to not trust their new allies in the Muslim border regions.

In May of 1922, Lenin began preparations for a purge of non-communist intellectuals, especially those who had "fraternized with White Guards," and who "sought to use 'legal' opportunities under Soviet power in order to continue stubbornly…the same work that resulted in failure of the counterrevolution in its open struggle against Soviet power…"[20] A parting of ways between the Jadids

and the Soviet state began in 1926, "when Akmal Ikramov (1898-1938), the first secretary of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, denounced the Jadids as mouthpieces of the local bourgeoise," which—given that the Ulema had been successfully relegated to secondary importance—was likely untrue.[21]

Caught up in the revolutionary fervor of the Civil War years, Sultan-Galiev criticized the Soviet state's policy towards the Muslim border regions and the "East" in general. He became frustrated with the Soviet government's lack of commitment towards revolution in non-European regions. He argued that the Soviet state abandoned the Soviet Republic of Gilan, in Iran, that the Soviet state did not support uprisings in Afghanistan, nor was the Soviet state actively fomenting revolution in the East.[22] Sultan-Galiev noted that these failings were unacceptable, given that the "ancient national-class hatred of the East" for Western imperialists should be fully taken advantage of to aid the international revolution. He proposed that the material wealth at the disposal of Western capitalists in their colonies would make proletarian revolution in Europe impossible as was evident in the failures of the Hungarian Soviet Republic and German Spartacists.[23] Sultan-Galiev's criticism of the Soviet state's policy toward the East was one born out of a desire to fulfill both the dream of international revolution and anti-imperialist liberation. He saw these two things as completely dependent on one another, and genuinely did not think that international revolution will succeed without overthrowing colonial rule. His call for the Soviet government to act on account of its anti-imperialist rhetoric was supported by the actions of the active Muslim populations of Central Asia.

A workers' movement in Iran, which had been building momentum since the 1870s, developed into full revolution with the establishment of the Soviet Republic of Gilan by the Communist Party of Iran in 1920. The Soviet government began to support the movement, but then withdrew its support less than a year later, allowing the movement to be crushed in September of 1921 by Reza Pahlavi's nationalist forces.[24] Similarly, no other substantial alliances were made between Marxists and Islamic militants because "the treatment of Muslim activists within the USSR itself was, as early as 1920, an issue that served to antagonize non-Soviet militants."[25] It seemed to many Muslims, inside of Russia and outside of its borders, that the Soviet state's calls for decolonization was not genuine. Furthermore, the Soviet state had no intention of allowing for the liberation of national minorities like Russia's Muslims. During the first Congress of the Peoples of the East convened in Baku in September of 1920, many national minority leaders voiced their complaints about *Russian* abuses of non-Russian peoples—particularly, the Kalmyks voiced disdain, but others were in consensus.[26] Many recognized these abuses as the Soviet state's feigned support, even abuse of non-Russian peoples. This resulted in apathy toward the Soviet cause abroad.

The Soviet state, in response to the general discontent voiced by Jadids and Russian minority leaders, established a new nationalities policy. The new policy of Korenizatsiya (indigenization) was announced by Joseph Stalin at the Party Congress of April 1923. Korenizatsiya saw a marked change in policy towards the nationalities by the Soviet state and ushered in a period of great improvement for the lives of most Russian minorities. Sultan-Galiev criticized the policy, because he rejected the relegation of non-Russian Soviets to a secondary status. He was, like many Jadids, an advocate for a federated Russia, but was also likely frustrated with other party members' avoidance of decolonization as a priority.

Stalin did not accept this criticism and soon had Sultan-Galiev arrested for orchestrating an anti-Soviet pan-Turkic separatist movement—charges that had little truth about them. These claims and the arrest of Sultan-Galiev became the precedent for future arrests of Jadids under the slogan of Sultangalievshchina (Sultan-Galievism).[27] Gary Guadagnolo explains that "[t]his term would come to epitomize the worst kind of nationalist deviation, conducted by traitors within the Party ranks," and was invoked to arrest and deport thousands of Tatar Muslims.[28] If there was a prominent Jadid who was not advocating for nationalist separatism within the Soviet state, it was Sultan-Galiev, who was a genuine supporter of the international socialist revolution. Thus, the Jadids who had married into the Soviet state apparat were vetted under similar claims, because most of them had associations with past nationalist movements such as the Kokand utonomy movement, the Basmachi movement, or their contact with "White Guards." Jadids' development of nationalist sentiments in the early years of 1917 were used against them by the end of the 1920s.

The Soviet state did not trust the Jadids, and began to view them as "old intellectuals" by 1936.[29] Jadids, and Muslims generally, encountered great Russian chauvinism by Soviet officials whose ideas of 'the East' adhered to classical orientalist fictions.[30] Their marriage was born out of convenience, although they shared a great number of similarities, including strong anti-imperialist rhetoric, desire for radical social and cultural reform, and the idea that "modernization" was essential for the future of their society. Yet, these similarities were not enough to exclude the Jadids from the mass paranoia and purges of the 1930s. Most Jadids suffered one of three fates: they either fled the USSR and continued their activities in a neighboring nation in the years prior to 1917, died in the Basmachi Uprisings which lasted from 1918 well into the 1930s, or were arrested, imprisoned, or executed during the purges of the 1930s.[31]

Even those Jadids who did entertain and support Marxism genuinely became frustrated with the Soviet state's policies in the East, and eventually were purged for pushing the issue or criticizing the party's inactivity. Though the Jadids sought progressive social and cultural reform in Central Asia, they mostly failed to represent the population which they sought to change. Only a few notable Jadids, like Sultan-Galiev, successfully connected

the objectives of the Jadids, Marxism, and the combustible anti-imperialist sentiments of Central Asian Muslims into a coherent ideology. His brand of Muslim-Marxism largely died with his arrest in 1923 following his criticism of Korenizatsiya. Sultan-Galiev would be released and rearrested several times, until his execution in Moscow in 1940.

Michael Scirè

Class of 2018

Endnotes

1. Vladimir Lenin, *Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism* (New York: Bantam Books,1966).
2. Jonathan Daly and Leonid Trofimov, "Kalmyks at the First Congress of the Peoples of the East in Baku, 1920," in *Russia in War and Revolution, 1914–1922: A Documentary History* (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc, 2009).
3. Vanja Hamzic, "Mir-Said Sultan-Galiev and the Idea of Muslim Marxism: Empire, Third World(s) and Praxis," *Third World Quarterly* 37, no.11 (2016): 2048.
4. Gary Guadagnolo, "'Who Am I?': Revolutionary Narratives and the Production of the Minority Self in the Early Soviet Era," *Region* 2, no. 1 (2013): 72–73.
5. Adeeb Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966), 80–113.
6. Adeeb Khalid, "Backwardness and the Quest for Civilization: Early Soviet Central Asia in Comparative Perspective," *Slavic Review* 65, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 239.
7. Mark Steinberg, *The Russian Revolution, 1905-1921* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1917), 241.
8. Adeeb Khalid, "Tashkent 1917: Muslim Politics in Revolutionary Turkistan." *Slavic Review* 55, no. 2 (Summer 1996): 271–275.
9. Steinberg, *The Russian Revolution*, 243.
10. Khalid, "Backwardness and the Quest for Civilization," 240.
11. Jonathan Daly and Leonid Trofimov, "Resolution of the First All-Russian Muslim Congress, May 1-11, 1917," In *Russia in War and Revolution, 1914–1922: A Documentary History* (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc, 2009).
12. Khalid, "Tashkent 1917," 293.
13. Ibid., 296.
14. Jonathan Daly and Leonid Trofimov, "Turkestan Liberation Movement, 1917," In *Russia in War and Revolution, 1914–1922: A Documentary History* (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc, 2009).
15. Steinberg, *The Russian Revolution*, 243.
16. Khalid, "Tashkent 1917," 296.
17. Jonathan Daly and Leonid Trofimov, "A Local Misunderstanding about the Role of Muslim Clergy, September 1918," In *Russia in War and Revolution, 1914–1922: A Documentary History* (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc, 2009).
18. Guadagnolo, "'Who Am I?" 78.
19. Khalid, "Backwardness and the Quest for Civilization," 241.
20. Jonathan Daly and Leonid Trofimov, "Official Denunciation of Non-Communist Intellectuals, August 1922," in *Russia in War and Revolution, 1914–1922: A Documentary History* (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc, 2009).
21. Khalid, "Backwardness and the Quest for Civilization," 242.
22. Mir-Said Sultan-Galiev, "The Social Revolution and the East," *Review* 6, no.1 (Summer 1982): 4–5.
23. Ibid., 8.
24. Hassan Hakimian, "Wage Labor and Migration: Persian Workers in Southern Russia," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 17, no. 4 (Nov 1985): 443–462.

25. Fred Halliday, "'Islam' and Soviet Foreign Policy," *Arab Studies Quarterly* 9, no. 3 (Summer 1987): 219.
26. Daly and Trofimov, "Kalmyks at the First Congress of the Peoples of the East in Baku, 1920."
27. Guadagnolo, "'Who Am I?" 78–79.
28. Ibid., 70.
29. Adeeb Khalid, "Backwardness and the Quest for Civilization," 242.
30. Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979).
31. Charles Weller, "Modernist Reform and Independence Movements: Central Asian Muslims and Koreans in Comparative Historical Perspective, 1950-1940," *Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 21 (2014): 355.

Morgan Sigur

Black Representation on Campus

In 1966, civil rights leader, Stokely Carmichael gave a speech at University of California, Berkeley, where he used the phrase "Black Power" to describe an ideology of racial pride and black autonomy. Black Power is defined as the mobilization of the political and economic power of American blacks to compel respect for their rights, but Carmichael's use of the phrase was most commonly accepted. The phrase "Black Power" had been used before the 1960s, but Stokely Carmichael's speech in 1966 was the first time the phrase reached a large audience.[1] Black Power became an appealing ideology for African Americans who were dissatisfied with the direction of the civil rights movement, and it became a national turning point. During this period, activism on campuses began to increase due to the spread of counterculture. Also, Carmichael had just become head of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), which was one of the most prominent civil rights groups on college campuses and contributed to the rise of Black Power on campuses. In the late 1960s, there were several historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs) in Maryland that began to embrace the Black Power movement, but there was no sign of involvement at Towson State. Towson State students did not embrace the Black Power movement because of the underrepresentation of African Americans within the school. Instead, organizations on campus worked to empower black students and give them means of expression through creating and advertising events, meetings, and resources that fostered a sense of community and acceptance among African American students.

Black Power was rooted in the belief of racial pride, self-sufficiency, and equality within the African American community and was an ideology, a movement, or a strategy. Before the 1960s, nonviolent protests were commonplace and were the most effective way to address civil rights. However, this ideology of nonviolence lost favor with a large portion of the African American community in the mid and late 1960s.[2] Progress had stalled after the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which outlawed discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin. This is because people started becoming complacent once big changes started being made. Some black activists felt that pacifism could not ultimately spark progress. Protests covered by the media were often characterized by demonstrators using drastic measures, such as rioting, seizing buildings, and using violence. It became clear that dramatic action was necessary to catch people's attention, which often required civil disobedience

and sometimes violence. Also, integration was no longer seen as a solution to the problem. There were doubts about how committed the government was to improving conditions for African Americans, and many black people stopped seeing well-meaning white activists as allies. As a result, the idea that white power structures needed to be taken down — by force if necessary — became more prevalent.[3] This change in perspective encouraged blacks to focus on solidarity within their communities, in cities, churches, teams, or schools.

At the beginning of the 1960s, government action against discrimination was stalled until protests began to spring up in the South due to problems with police brutality. These protests put pressure on federal and state governments to protect black citizens and push for equality.

In 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act into law which ended segregation in public places and banned discrimination in the workplace.[4] The Act also commissioned the Office of Education to desegregate schools. As a result, the government began implementing more campus based affirmative action initiatives at schools, which contributed to an increase in African Americans enrolling at white colleges and universities. Between 1964 and 1970, enrollment of black students doubled nationally. However, despite this jump in enrollment, black students still made up less than six percent of the population of students in colleges and universities in the United States.[5]

Integrating institutions in Maryland proved to be especially challenging. It took continuous prompting from the state government for almost ten years for progress to finally take place. In 1969, Towson State College was nearly one hundred percent white. By 1973, Towson State was able to attract more African American students, but the University had one of the lowest percentages of integration within the state of Maryland. Merely five percent of Towson students were black; only University of Maryland College Park had a lower percentage of black students in Maryland.[6]

As the federal government enforced integration more, there were some African Americans who felt that integration alone did not solve their problems. There were groups that felt that even though blacks now had access to better education, these institutions did not fully recognize the prejudices Africans Americans faced.[7] Especially in the mid-1960s, when very few black students attended primarily white institutions, it was not uncommon for minority students to feel unwelcome, experience hostility, or feel isolated and unsupported in these white-dominated institutions. These feelings of dissatisfaction and alienation prompted African American students to look for other ways to advance themselves that did not rely on white authorities.

This very desire aligned perfectly with Stokely Carmichael's ideology of "Black Power." This argument for unity within the African American community became a pivotal way for students to express their desire for change. As a result, black students in colleges began to bond together in solidarity and make the Black Power movement prominent on their campuses.[8] From 1968 to 1970, a number of colleges in the Washington metropolitan area adopted the ideology of Black Power. One of the most prominent protests that utilized the idea of Black Power took place at Howard University in Washington, D.C. Howard students seized their administration building to demand a change in "black education" and to promote black awareness or black consciousness. They demanded that students be taught how to use their skills to enhance their own communities and fight segregation. The protestors preached the ideas of Black Power and black pride, and they listened to speeches from black leaders such as Malcolm X to learn about using violence to fight prejudice.[9]

Despite Black Power's presence at surrounding schools, Towson State College did not to join the movement. Many of the schools that took part were historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs). With a majority of the students being black, institutions like Howard had the support, representation, and numbers needed to use an idea as radical as Black Power during a campus movement. Towson State had too small of a black population to successfully employ such a controversial idea.[10] The premise of Black Power relied on blacks advocating for themselves, so having such a small population of blacks at Towson made it nearly impossible for them to have their voices heard without relying on white peers and authorities to advance their cause. Many African Americans were choosing to go to historically black colleges like Bowie State College, Coppin State College, and Morgan State College. At a time when solidarity within black communities was becoming more popularized, it was easier to go to a primarily black school.[11] HBCUs were also able to support one another and work together to foster change, because they had such a critical mass of students to form a community.

Many of the HBCUs that were joining the Black Power movement relied on one another for support. After the protest that happened at Howard University, Morgan State College students demonstrated in solidarity and let Howard know that students at Morgan State supported the efforts being made at Howard.[12] Towson State was a historically white school, so it was harder for black students attending Towson State to gain support from surrounding schools.

At the time, there was also a fear that expressing dissatisfaction about the racial climate of one's school could impact one's opportunity to get an education. Black students at University of Illinois, for example, expressed concerns about their financial aid being cut if they partook in radical movements.[13] On the other hand, there were students that felt obligated to educate their

peers about the injustices they faced, but they did not want to risk getting kicked out because attending a primarily white school gave them prestige and promised better job opportunities. Nonetheless, Towson students were still looking for a way to initiate progress and feel welcomed on campus, so people began creating organizations for African Americans to get involved in.

One of the most prominent African American organizations on Towson State's campus was the Black Student Union. Black Student Unions across the United States had a similar set of goals that were summarized in the Ten-Point Program. The Black Student Unions wanted full enrollment to be available at quality schools, where they had a say in the type of education they would receive. They wanted to end unfair taxing for low quality schools and to learn how to live in modern society. Also, the Black Student Unions wanted an immediate end to police brutality and the presence of police to be restricted from school premises. Furthermore, they wanted racist teachers restricted from all public schools and for students that had been exempt, expelled, or suspended unfairly to be reinstated at the school. The BSUs wanted all students to be tried in a student court with a jury of their peers or students from their school. Lastly, they wanted power, enrollment, equipment, education, teachers, justice, and peace for black students. Overall, the Black Student Unions wanted fair treatment and due process for black students in America.[14] The Black Student Union at Towson State College reflected these basic values and aimed to bring about these changes.

In an effort to establish a branch of the Black Student Union on Towson State College's campus, a group of African American students presented a list of demands to President James L. Fisher on February 25, 1970. In President Fisher's response, he stated that he was fully committed to integrating Towson State College and subsequently granted the Black Student Union most of their requests. Some of these requests included a place to hold meetings, duplicating materials, and supplies for the club.[15] The support shown by the President acted as a symbolic step in the right direction for the improvement of the racial climate at Towson. However, President Fisher stated that the BSU must go through the SGA to have funds granted to them. Procedurally, this is not unusual, but in 1970 there were no African American officers on the SGA board.[16] The Black Student Union was forced to work under the authority of their white peers, which indirectly diminished some of the power they had just gained. African Americans on college campuses had to learn over time that less radical approaches of empowerment required time and patience to see a successful result.

After the Black Student Union was officially established at Towson State, the organization released a position paper outlining its purpose and intention. Among other things, the paper stated that Towson's BSU was meant to be exclusively black due to the needs of the black community. These needs

included understanding the role of African Americans in American history, discussing current issues they faced, and providing educational opportunities they might not have access to otherwise.[17] The students wanted to make it apparent that black students had different needs than white students, and those needs were not being met because black students faced institutionalized racism and were unable to voice their opinions and concerns. The BSU would aim to enhance the social, cultural, and intellectual experience of all African American students at Towson. In the position paper, the Black Student Union made it very clear that the club would not be dedicated to rhetorical extremism, which is a kind of single-minded outlook on an issue that does not consider other perspectives.[18] This statement was meant to show that the BSU did not embrace movements like the Black Power Movement, which helped them garner support from the SGA and the administration. Most importantly, the BSU moved to extinguish any injustices faced by their black peers.[19]

The Black Student Union did a number of things to create a community for black students at Towson. On a smaller scale, the organization held club meetings, brought in speakers, and planned enjoyable activities to help legitimize the club and build the community. On a larger scale, the BSU helped develop the African American Cultural Center in 1974, which helped to increase awareness about the diversity of the black community on campus. They also helped develop the African and African-American Studies program. These programs were vital to the empowerment of black students because they gave African Americans the opportunity to learn more about their culture, their role in history, and how they can impact society in the present. This gave black students a chance to learn about their identity, which was a right that they were denied in the past.[20]

Even though Towson State College's Black Student Union did not use radicalized tactics to give students a voice, they still gave students the proper means to advocate for their rights. In 1970, the BSU placed an advertisement in the Towerlight, Towson's student-run newspaper, promoting Malcolm X University.[21] Malcolm X University was established in North Carolina, and it gave black students an opportunity to learn about black history and how to advance themselves in society using the ideology of Black Power and the teachings and beliefs of Malcolm X.[22] The Black Student Union's willingness to advertise this kind of resource demonstrates that African American students at Towson still supported the Black Power movement, but they did not have the support to bring it to their campus.

Another organization that developed during the 1960s at Towson State was the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). The Students for a Democratic Society was primarily known for its anti-war sentiments and disapproval of the Vietnam War.[23] However, the SDS also was involved in the civil rights movement, and it

disapproved of the unfair treatment of African-Americans. The SDS wanted to commit itself to searching for democratic alternatives to current practices that could be instilled on campus and in the community in an effort to improve the society. In 1974, the SDS released a pamphlet to Towson State College students titled the Study Guide and Manual for Anti-Racist Activity.[24] This pamphlet was released initially to garner support to get rid of a racist textbook being used in psychology classes. The SDS hoped that the pamphlet and removal of the textbook would strengthen the anti-racism movement on campus and influence bigger changes, such as combating blatant racism in the classroom.

The SDS pamphlet gives examples of racism on Towson's campus. The pamphlet indicates that racism could be seen in all areas of life on campus whether it be in dormitories, in clubs, or in the classroom.[25] The example the pamphlet specifically highlighted revealed how racism was prevalent in the employment practices, hiring of faculty, and advisement. The pamphlet states that black student workers held the majority of lower paying jobs and made up the majority of night shift workers on campus. These practices show that the efforts of African Americans were being undermined, and they were not provided the chance to make more money or work more desirable hours. When it comes to faculty, there was a minimal amount of minority staff members despite the gradual increase in minority students attending Towson State. The booklet argued that Towson intentionally was not hiring more minority faculty members and that students should encourage the college to be more inclusive in their hiring practices. For student advisement, the pamphlet stated that many minority students were treated unfairly and were not given the same quality of guidance as white students. The SDS's willingness to blatantly call out these issues demonstrates how the organization was trying to combat racism and empower black students through voicing their struggles.

There were other resources on campus besides the BSU and SDS, and black students could learn about them in a pamphlet released by Towson State University titled The Black Student's Guide to Baltimore.[26] One page had information for the Office of Minority Affairs and listed programs and services designed to address the interests and needs of black students. Such programs included the African-American Cultural Center and Mahogany Magazine. The African-American Cultural Center provided resources about the social, political, and historical issues African Americans faced in the past and at that present time. The center also served as a place where African Americans could relax in between classes and engage with other students of their race. Mahogany Magazine was a weekly radio show that was produced by black students and touched on topics that interested the black community, such as the daily prejudices many black students faced. Another page had information on traditionally black organizations in Towson State University. Such organizations

included the Brotherhood and the Sisterhood, Christian service organizations for African Americans, and Greek organizations that focused on the concerns of black people. By making black students aware of the resources available to them, black students were able to interact with one another and feel that there were places on campus where their voices could be heard. Towson State University's release of this pamphlet demonstrates how the administration became progressively more aware of the needs of African American students.

Resources for African Americans were not exclusively available at Towson State College. There were also many materials accessible in the surrounding community. The Black Student's Guide to Baltimore had information on these materials to make students aware of what was being offered to them. The pamphlet provided information on nearby museums, entertainment, churches, and businesses that were either geared towards or run by African Americans.[27] This guide allowed students to connect with the outer black community and provided another way for African Americans on campus to grow in solidarity. Furthermore, supporting black owned businesses was a crucial part of making black communities self-sufficient.[28] Self-sufficiency was emphasized as the first step to liberation from white power structures. When African Americans relied on each other to advance their own economies, they became their own advocates for change and equality.

An important part of empowering African American students on campus was making them aware of how blacks have contributed to the history of America and how they could play an important part in modern society. In 1966, "The Negro in American History" was being offered as a course for the first time after students requested a course about African American history.[29] Even though the presence of this class signified progress, improvements still needed to be made to present an accurate account of history. In 1969, the title of the course was changed from "The Negro in American History" to "History of Black Americans" which was seen as a more appropriate title for the course.[30] This change was likely influenced by the diminishing use of the term "negro" and the increasing use of the term "black" to describe African Americans. The course descriptions also changed. It went from looking at how American history impacted the "negro" to looking at the role of black Americans in developing America. This shift in viewing African Americans as contributors to the mold of American society signifies tremendous progress and shows African American students that they are accounted for. It is empowering for black students to learn about more than just a white-washed version of history.

Towson State students chose not to embrace the radical ideology of Black Power because they were unable to gather enough support. Instead, organizations provided resources to empower black students and provide a sense of solidarity. These methods were ultimately successful and continued to expand as more minority students enrolled at Towson State University. Efforts to create a welcoming environment for black students in the 1960s and 70s has contributed to making Towson State a place of inclusion and diversity today.

Mogan Sigur

Class of 2021

Endnotes

1. Lakisha Odlum, "The Black Power Movement," *Digital Public Library of America*, https://dp.la/primary-source-sets/sets/the-black-power-movement/.
2. Ibid.
3. Joy Ann Williamson, *Black Power on Campus: The University of Illinois, 1965–75* (University of Illinois Press, 2003), 26–27.
4. "Civil Rights Act," *History.com*, www.history.com/topics/black-history/civil-rights-act.
5. Williamson, *Black Power on Campus,* 26–27.
6. Sheryl McCarthy, "Integration in State: Nowhere to 5 per Cent," *The Sun (Baltimore)*, February 18, 1973.
7. Jeffrey O.G. Ogbar, *Black Power: Radical Politics and African American Identity* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), 136.
8. Williamson, *Black Power on Campus,* 24–27.
9. "Black Awareness Moved Howard Student Protest," *The Sun (Baltimore)*, March 24, 1968.
10. McCarthy, "Integration in State."
11. "Segregation Hangovers," *The Sun (Baltimore)*, May 22, 1968.
12. "Grievances Due Hearing at Morgan," *The Sun (Baltimore)*, March 22, 1968.
13. Williamson, *Black Power on Campus,* 115.
14. Louis G. Heath, "Mutiny Does Not Happen Lightly," www2.iath.virginia.edu/sixties/HTML_docs/Resources/Primary/Manifestos/BSU_platform.html.
15. Donna Quante, "BSU Present Demands," *Towerlight (Towson)*, March 20, 1970.
16. "Black Student Union," *James L. Fisher to The Black Student Union*, March 5, 1970, Towson, Maryland, Series 31, Box 12, Folder 5, Towson University Archives.
17. Towson University's Black Student Union, "History," *Towson University's Black Student Union*, https://wp.towson.edu/bsu/about/.
18. Amy Gutmann, "The Lure & Dangers of Extremist Rhetoric," *Penn Office of the President*, president.upenn.edu/meet-president/extremist-rhetoric.
19. Black Student Union, *Position Paper: Black Student Union of Towson State College*, Report, Towson State College, Towson, MD, 1970, 1–2, Series 31, Box 12, Folder 5, Towson University Archives.
20. Towson University, "History."
21. Black Student Union, "Blacks Are Leaving," *The Towerlight (Towson)*, March 6, 1970.
22. "Durham's Malcolm X Liberation University," *North Carolina Department of Natural and Cultural Resources*, www.ncdcr.gov/blog/2016/10/25/durhams-malcolm-x- liberation-university.
23. Tom Hayden, "Port Huron Statement," *Speech, National Convention, Hanover College, Port Huron*, June 15, 1952, history.hanover.edu/courses/excerpts/111hur.html.
24. *Students for a Democratic Society, Study Guide and Manual for Anti-Racist Activity*, Towson, MD: Towson State College, 1974, Series 9, Box 8, Folder 10, Towson University Archives.
25. *Students for a Democratic Society, Study Guide*.
26. Towson State University, *The Black Student's Guide to Baltimore*, Towson, MD: Towson State University, Box 12, Folder 6, Towson University Archives.
27. Towson State University, *The Black Student's Guide to Baltimore*.
28. "The Black Community," *Urban Intellectuals*, September 19, 2013, https://urbanintellectuals.com/2013/09/19/black-community-doesnt-need-segregated-self-sufficient/.

29. Mary Catherine Kahl, *New Courses*, Towson State College, Towson, MD, 1966. Series 5, Box 3, Folder 7, Towson University Archives.
30. Mary Catherine Kahl, *Changes in Course Titles*, Towson State College, Towson, MD, 1969, Series 5, Box 5, Folder 6, Towson University Archives.